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[510]Alan Stephens, Kosovo, or the Future of War , Paper Number 77, Air Power Studies Center, Royal Australian Air Force, Fairbairn, Australia, August 1999, p. 21.

[511]Michael Mandelbaum, “A Perfect Failure: NATO’s War Against Yugoslavia,” Foreign Affairs , September/October 1999, p. 2. That charge was based on the fact that prior to the air war’s start on March 24, 1999, only some 2,500 civilian innocents had died in the Serb‑Albanian civil war, whereas during the 11‑week bombing effort, an estimated 10,000 civilians were killed by marauding bands of Serbs unleashed by Milosevic in direct response to Allied Force.

[512]Robert Hewson, “Operation Allied Force: The First 30 Days,” World Air Power Journal , Fall 1999, p. 24.

[513]“Briefing by SACEUR General Wesley Clark,” Brussels, NATO Headquarters, April 13, 1999.

[514]See, for example, the riposte to Mandelbaum by the Clinton administration’s deputy national security adviser, James B. Steinberg, “A Perfect Polemic: Blind to Reality on Kosovo,” Foreign Affairs , November/December 1999, pp. 128–133.

[515]Javier Solana, “NATO’s Success in Kosovo,” Foreign Affairs , November/December 1999, p. 114.

[516]Karl Mueller, “Deus ex Machina? Coercive Air Power in Bosnia and Kosovo,” unpublished paper, School of Advanced Air Power Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, November 7, 1999, p. 6.

[517]“Wesley Clark Looks Back,” National Journal , February 26, 2000, p. 612.

[518]Interview with Admiral James O. Ellis, USN, commander in chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe, Naples, Italy, May 30, 2000. This is not to say, however, that the allies had no intrinsic stake at all. Italy had a stake in preventing further depredations by Milosevic because of the refugee problem they created. Greece had a major stake in what happened to the Serbs because of a largely sympathetic population. Germany also found itself being inundated with refugees. Hungary had good reason to worry about the Hungarian population still inside Serbia. All of the NATO countries had an intrinsic interest in stability in Europe, and Milosevic was, if nothing else, a destabilizer of the first order. I am grateful to Alan Gropman of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D.C., for reminding me of these important facts.

[519]Air Commodore A. G. B. Vallance, RAF, chief of staff, NATO Reaction Forces (Air) Staff, Kalkar, Germany, “Did We Really Have a Good War? Myths in the Making,” unpublished manuscript, no date, p. 2.

[520]Interview with Air Marshal Sir John Day, RAF, UK Ministry of Defense director of operations in Allied Force, RAF Innsworth, United Kingdom, July 25, 2000.

[521]These and other surprises should stand as a sobering reminder that the comparatively seamless and unfettered successes achieved by allied air power during Operation Desert Storm were most likely the exception rather than the rule for future joint and combined operations–both the operating area and the circumstances surrounding the 1991 Gulf War were unique. For more on this point, see Air Vice Marshal Tony Mason, RAF (Ret.), Air Power: A Centennial Appraisal , London, Brassey’s, 1994, pp. 140–158.

[522]Eric Schmitt, “Weak Serb Defense Puzzles NATO,” New York Times , March 26, 1999.

[523]For a fuller development of this point, see Daniel L. Byman, Matthew C. Waxman, and Eric Larson, Air Power as a Coercive Instrument , Santa Monica, California, RAND, MR‑1061‑AF, 1999. See also Grant T. Hammond, “Myths of the Air War Over Serbia: Some ‘Lessons’ Not to Learn,” Aerospace Power Journal , Winter 2000, pp. 78–86.

[524]Cohen and Shelton, “Joint Statement.”

[525]I am indebted to my RAND colleagues James Schneider, Myron Hura, and Gary McLeod for these on‑target summary observations.

[526]Cited in Colonel Steve Pitotti, USAF, “Global Environments, Threats, and Military Strategy (GETM) Update,” Air Armament Summit 2000 briefing, 2000.

[527]William M. Arkin, “Inside the Air Force, Officers Are Frustrated About the Air War,” Washington Post , April 25, 1999.

[528]Rowan Scarborough, “Officers Criticize Air War Strategy,” Washington Times , May 10, 1999.

[529]Interview with Air Marshal Sir John Day, RAF, UK Ministry of Defense director of operations in Allied Force, RAF Innsworth, United Kingdom, July 25, 2000.

[530]William Drozdiak, “Air War Commander Says Kosovo Victory Near,” Washington Post , May 24, 1999. Clark himself later indicated that his chief “measure of merit” in keeping Allied Force on track was “not to lose aircraft, minimize the loss of aircraft.” He further stated that this exacting desideratum “drove our decisions on tactics, targets, and which airplanes could participate,” but that it was motivated by a “larger political rationale: if we wanted to keep this campaign going indefinitely, we had to protect our air fleet. Nothing would hurt us more with public opinion than headlines that screamed, ‘NATO LOSES TEN AIRPLANES IN TWO DAYS.’” General Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat , New York, Public Affairs, 2001, p. 183.

[531]It bears noting that the zero‑loss issue, however seriously it may have been regarded at the highest leadership levels, had little day‑to‑day impact on actual combat operations. As an F‑15E instructor electronic warfare officer (EWO) who flew multiple combat missions with the 494th Fighter Squadron recalled from first‑hand experience: “The issue of the ‘no‑losses rule’ did not filter down to the aircrew level, since we always plan with that goal in mind. We were briefed that there were no ‘high‑priority’ targets prior to the opening of hostilities, but that ended up having little effect on the risk level that we were willing to accept. The concrete effects of the ‘no‑loss rule’ were the 15,000‑ft floor and a number of unreasonable ROE restrictions. However, outside the immediate tactical constraints imposed by the ROE, the prevailing high‑level attitude had no effect on tactical operations. We were aware of the priority placed on minimizing losses, but the effect on the mission was overrated. There were no cases that I am aware of where the aircrew said, ‘Well, this looks a little hairy, and the priority is not to lose an airplane, so I won’t do it.’ We were more likely to abort an attack for collateral damage concerns than we were to abort for survivability issues. As would be expected, aircrews pressed to the target in the face of serious opposition.” Major Michael Pietrucha, USAF, personal communication to the author, July 9, 2001.

[532]“Ralston Sees Potential for More Wars of Gradual Escalation,” Inside the Pentagon , September 16, 1999, p. 1.

[533]“Washington Outlook,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , August 23, 1999, p. 27. It hardly follows, of course, that gradualism and coalitions must invariably be synonymous. They certainly were not in Desert Storm in 1991. Clearly, the extent to which gradualist strategies will prove unavoidable in the future will depend heavily on both the shared stakes for would‑be coalition partners and the skill of their leaders in setting the direction and tone of coalition conduct.

[534]On this point, Air Vice Marshal Mason remarked that he had not “spent the past 25 years trying to persuade unbelievers of the efficacy of air power only to finish up whining because political circumstances made operations difficult.” Personal communication to the author, October 22, 1999. In a similar spirit, the leader of USAFE’s post–Allied Force munitions effectiveness investigation in Kosovo later suggested that airmen should “consider a politically restricted target list like the weather: complain about it, but deal with it.” Colonel Brian McDonald, USAF, briefing at RAND, Santa Monica, California, December 14, 1999.

[535]It further follows that airmen, for their part, need to learn not only how to conduct gradual campaigns more effectively, but also how better to explain convincingly to politicians the value of using mass and shock early and the greater strategic effectiveness of effects‑based targeting.

[536]See Colonel Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, “Gradual Escalation: NATO’s Kosovo Air Campaign, Though Decried as a Strategy, May Be the Future of War,” Armed Forces Journal International , October 1999, p. 18.

[537]Air Commodore A. G. B. Vallance, RAF, “After Kosovo: Implications of Operation Allied Force for Air Power Development,” unpublished paper, p. 4.

[538]Mueller, “Deus ex Machina?” p. 16.

[539]This includes being held increasingly accountable for their own combat losses. The Allied Force SEAD experience showed that in crises where less‑than‑vital U.S. interests are at stake, near‑zero attrition of friendly aircraft and their aircrews will be a high, and possibly determining, priority governing operational tactics.

[540]Conversation with Admiral James Ellis, USN, Headquarters Allied Forces Southern Europe, Naples, Italy, May 30, 2000.

[541]William Drozdiak, “Allies Need Upgrade, General Says.” As sensible as this suggestion may have sounded after the fact, however, one must ask how workable it would have been in actual practice. Wars characteristically feature dynamics that push participants beyond anything imaginable at the outset. Setting clear going‑in rules is easy and feasible enough for something short and relatively straightforward, like Operation Deliberate Force and Operation El Dorado Canyon, the joint USAF‑Navy raid on Libya in 1986. Expecting them in larger and more open‑ended operations, however, means counting on a predictability of events that does not exist in real life. The fact is that there was a consensus at the start of Allied Force about what was acceptable and what everyone was willing to do, and that was for 91 targets and two nights of bombing. NATO’s cardinal error was not its failure to reach a consensus before firing the first shot; it was its refusal to be honest up front about what it would do if its assumptions about Milosevic’s resolve proved false. I thank Dr. Daniel Harrington, Office of History, Hq USAFE, for having shared this insightful observation with me. I would add that had NATO’s leaders done better at attending to that responsibility, they would have gone a long way toward satisfying General Short’s expressed concern.

[542]Interview with Lieutenant General Michael Short, USAF, PBS Frontline , “War in Europe,” February 22, 2000.

[543]Bradley Graham, “General Says U.S. Readiness Is Ailing,” Washington Post , April 30, 1999.

[544]General John Jumper, USAF, “Oral Histories Accomplished in Conjunction with Operation Allied Force/Noble Anvil.”

[545]Drozdiak, “Allies Need Upgrade, General Says.”

[546]Ibid.

[547]Doyle McManus, “Clinton’s Massive Ground Invasion That Almost Was,” Los Angeles Times , June 9, 2000.

[548]Andrew J. Bacevich, “Target Belgrade: Why a Ground War Would Be a Rout,” National Review , May 3, 1999, p. 29.

[549]General Merrill A. McPeak, USAF (Ret.), “The Kosovo Result: The Facts Speak for Themselves,” Armed Forces Journal International , September 1999, p. 64. In a similar vein, the chief of staff of the RAF later faulted NATO’s decision to rule out a ground option from the start of the air war as “a strategic mistake” that enabled Serb forces to forgo preparing defensive positions, hide their tanks and artillery and make maximum use of deception against NATO attack efforts, and conduct their ethnic cleansing of Kosovo with impunity. Michael Evans, “Ground War ‘Error,’” London Times , March 24, 2000.

[550]Amplifying on his suggestion that luck was the key player, Ellis pointed out how much worse matters would have been for the alliance had NATO experienced any one of a number of untoward developments: an enemy attack on its troops deployed in theater with ground forces or tactical ballistic missiles; the possibility of even a few NATO aircrews being killed in action or captured as POWs; the continuation of the fighting into the winter; the depletion of U.S. precision munitions stocks; the weakening or evaporation of public support; an allied ground invasion becoming the only option; or a decision by France or Italy to withdraw from further participation.

[551]Revealingly, barely a week into Allied Force, one senior Clinton administration official, when asked what NATO’s strategy would be should Phase III of the air war fail to persuade Milosevic to admit defeat, replied: “There is no Phase IV.” Quoted in John Broder, “In Grim Week, Pep Talk from the President,” New York Times , April 1, 1999.

[552]Elaine M. Grossman, “For U.S. Commander in Kosovo, Luck Played Role in Wartime Success,” Inside the Pentagon , September 9, 1999, p. 1.

[553]Comments at an Air Force Association Eaker Institute colloquy, “Operation Allied Force: Strategy, Execution, Implications,” held at the Ronald Reagan International Trade Center, Washington, D.C., August 16, 1999.

[554]These were among numerous other conclusions suggested by Major General Ronald Keys, USAF, director of operations (J‑3), U.S. European Command, cited in Colonel Steve Pitotti, USAF, “Global Environments, Threats, and Military Strategy (GETM) Update,” Air Armament Summit 2000 briefing, Eglin AFB, Florida, 2000.

[555]Work on this is being performed by Alan Vick of RAND.

[556]Elaine M. Grossman, “U.S. Military Debates Link Between Kosovo Air War, Stated Objectives,” Inside the Pentagon , April 20, 2000, p. 6.

[557]A heated argument arose after the war ended between defenders and critics of the Clinton administration’s strategy for Kosovo over whether the approach taken, despite its low cost in noncombatant lives lost to direct collateral damage, nonetheless produced an unconscionably high loss of civilian innocents to the Serbian ethnic cleansing campaign which it allegedly accelerated. For a snapshot summary of the positions taken on both sides, see Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwarz, “Kosovo II: For the Record,” The National Interest , Fall 1999, pp. 9–15, and Ivo Daalder, “NATO and Kosovo,” The National Interest , Winter 1999/2000, pp. 113–117.

[558]I am grateful to Lieutenant General Bradley Hosmer, USAF (Ret.), for bringing this point to my attention.

[559]John F. Harris, “Berger’s Caution Has Shaped Role of U.S. in War,” Washington Post , May 16, 1999.

[560]In a measured indictment of the Clinton administration’s comportment in this regard, two Brookings Institution analysts wrote that “what was missing… was less allied will than a demonstrated American ability and willingness to lead a joint effort. NATO works best when Washington knows what it wants done and leads the effort to get the alliance there. In the runup to the Kosovo war, both elements were tragically lacking…. Although it is impossible to know whether the allies would have gone along with a more robust strategy, including early use of ground forces, the United States never made the case. U.S. policy presumed the allies’ rejection, just as it presumed congressional opposition to the use of ground forces.” Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo , Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 2000, pp. 98, 222.

[561]Eliot A. Cohen, “The Mystique of U.S. Air Power,” Foreign Affairs , January/February 1994, p. 109.

[562]Joseph Fitchett, “Clark Recalls ‘Lessons’ of Kosovo,” International Herald Tribune , May 3, 2000.