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[53]The USAF flew 84 percent of those sorties, the NATO allies 10 percent, and the U.S. Navy 6 percent.

[54]Graham, “Bombing Spreads.”

[55]Craig R. Whitney, “NATO Had Signs Its Strategy Would Fail Kosovars,” New York Times , April 1, 1999.

[56]William Drozdiak and Bradley Graham, “NATO Frustration Grows as Mission Falls Short,” Washington Post , April 8, 1999.

[57]Thomas W. Lippman and Dana Priest, “NATO Builds Firepower for 24‑Hour Attacks,” Washington Post , March 30, 1999.

[58]The NAC did not formally approve strikes on Phase III targets per se, although it did assent to target classes within Phase III.

[59]Hewson, “Operation Allied Force,” p. 22.

[60]Conversation with Vice Admiral Daniel J. Murphy, USN, commander, 6th Fleet, aboard USS LaSalle , Gaeta, Italy, June 8, 2000. See also Vice Admiral Daniel J. Murphy, USN, “The Navy in the Balkans,” Air Force Magazine , December 1999, p. 49. According to a later account by General Jumper, the strike against the Podgorica airfield was the most concentrated effort placed on any target throughout the entire course of Allied Force. To satisfy SACEUR’s objective, General Short needed to neutralize the airfield’s sortie generation capacity completely. At the time the target was selected, only 50 percent of the aim points required to meet that objective had been identified. It took 48 hours to accomplish the additional target analysis and to free up additional required NATO assets to carry out this strike. Since the Theodore Roosevelt had just arrived in the theater, it had not been tasked in the April 15 Air Tasking Order and accordingly had assets that were immediately available. As a result, F‑14 and F/A‑18 aircraft struck the hardened aircraft bunker (the highest‑value critical element) and used CAOC (Combined Air Operations Center) assets to assist in targeting and weaponeering. Other NATO assets struck the remaining critical elements 48 hours later and met SACEUR’s objectives. Conversation with General John P. Jumper, USAF, Hq Air Combat Command, Langley AFB, Virginia, May 15, 2001.

[61]See Commander Wayne D. Sharer, USN, “The Navy’s War over Kosovo,” Proceedings , U.S. Naval Institute, October 1999, pp. 26–29; and Robert Wall, “E‑2Cs Become Battle Managers with Reduced AEW Role,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , May 10, 1999, p. 38.

[62]Jason DeParle, “Allies’ Progress Remains Unclear as Few Details Are Made Public,” New York Times , April 5, 1999.

[63]In fairness to that effort, however, and given the many constraints that affected it–in contrast to the far fewer constraints that affected Desert Storm–weather, mainly an irritant during the Gulf War, was a significant factor during Operation Allied Force. Bad weather, combined with the higher population density of Serbia, the concern for collateral damage, and the increased surface‑to‑air threat, could easily have contributed to a lower relative intensity of strike operations. I thank Major Richard Leatherman, Hq Air Force Doctrine Center, for having called this possibility to my attention.

[64]John M. Broder, “Clinton Says Milosevic Hurts Claim to Kosovo,” New York Times , March 31, 1999.

[65]“Hope for the Best, and a Spot of Golf,” The Economist , April 3, 1999, p. 9.

[66]Steven Lee Myers, “Pentagon Said to Be Adding 300 Planes to Fight Serbs,” New York Times , April 13, 1999.

[67]One former senior U.S. officer commented that Clark had presented “a wish list that would choke a horse.” Elaine M. Grossman, “Clark’s Firepower Request for Kosovo Prompts Anxiety Among Chiefs,” Inside the Pentagon , April 15, 1999.

[68]Bradley Graham and Dana Priest, “Allies to Begin Flying Refugees Abroad,” Washington Post , April 5, 1999. In his subsequent memoirs, Clark frankly excoriated what he called “the reluctant Army mind‑set in Washington” on this issue and dismissed other critics of his requested AH‑64 commitment as “the voices of conventional air power” coming from “commanders who had no experience with the Apaches.” General Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat , New York, Public Affairs, 2001, pp. 230, 278.

[69]To which General Naumann countered in resigned exasperation: “It isn’t a good Rembrandt.” Robbins, Ricks, and King, Jr., “Milosevic’s Resolve Spawned More Unity in Alliance and a Wider Target List.”

[70]Michael Ignatieff, “The Virtual Commander: How NATO Invented a New Kind of War,”The New Yorker , August 2, 1999, p. 32.

[71]Bradley Graham and John Lancaster, “Most NATO Bombing Raids Target Previously Hit Sites,” Washington Post , April 21, 1999. In fairness to NATO planners, some of those reattacks were valid, because a few especially large area targets entailed numerous individual aim points, some of which were missed in the initial attacks. The vast majority, however, merely entailed what many frustrated NATO crewmembers referred to as “bouncing rubble,” having no practical effect and presenting considerable added risk to their own survivability. It was not uncommon for aircrews to complain vocally about having their “warm bodies sent out all over again to turn bricks into powder.”

[72]Craig R. Whitney, “NATO Chief Admits Bombs Fail to Stem Serb Operations,” New York Times , April 28, 1999.

[73]Neil King, Jr., “War Against Yugoslavia Lapses into Routine, but Clock Is Ticking,” Wall Street Journal , May 6, 1999.

[74]Doyle McManus, “Clinton’s Massive Ground Invasion That Almost Was,” Los Angeles Times , June 9, 2000.

[75]General John Jumper, USAF, “Oral Histories Accomplished in Conjunction with Operation Allied Force/Noble Anvil.”

[76]Dana Priest, “Target Selection Was Long Process,” Washington Post , September 20, 1999. One must take care, however, not to confuse Master Target File growth with approved target growth. Although target nominations increased dramatically as the air war entered full swing, getting those targets individually approved remained a challenge throughout the air war to the very end.

[77]Eric Schmitt and Steven Lee Myers, “NATO Said to Focus Raids on Serb Elite’s Property,” New York Times , April 19, 1999.

[78]In the end, however, only some 10 percent of the 48th Fighter Wing’s F‑15E combat missions were flown out of Lakenheath. The remainder were flown out of the wing’s forward operating location at Aviano. Conversation with USAF F‑15E aircrews, 492nd Fighter Squadron, RAF Lakenheath, England, April 28, 2001.

[79]Robert Hewson, “Allied Force, Part II: Overwhelming Air Power,” World Air Power Journal , Winter 1999/2000, p. 99.

[80]Paul Richter, “Bunker‑Busters Aim at Heart of Leadership,” Los Angeles Times , May 5, 1999.

[81]Ibid. The Pentagon’s formal report to Congress later indicated that “some” hardened underground command bunkers had been destroyed.

[82]Dana Priest, “France Acted as Group Skeptic,” Washington Post , September 20, 1999, and David A. Fulghum, “Russians Analyze U.S. Blackout Bomb,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , February 14, 2000, p. 59.

[83]An inertial navigation system (INS)–guided version of the weapon, a variant of the wind‑corrected munitions dispenser, is now said to be entering the U.S. munitions inventory. Fulghum, “Russians Analyze U.S. Blackout Bomb.”

[84]David A. Fulghum, “Electronic Bombs Darken Belgrade,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , May 10, 1999, p. 34.

[85]The results were more symbolic than strategically significant. After the May 3 attack, some 500 workers managed to clear the filaments sufficiently to restart the equipment within 15 hours. After a similar attack on May 8, the threads were cleared within 4 hours. William Arkin, “Smart Bombs, Dumb Targeting?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , May/June 2000, p. 52.

[86]Robert Block, “In Belgrade, Hardship Grows Under Sustained Air Assault,” Wall Street Journal , May 12, 1999.

[87]Steven Erlanger, “Economists Find Bombing Cuts Yugoslavia’s Production in Half,” New York Times , April 30, 1999.

[88]Philip Bennett and Steve Coll, “NATO Warplanes Jolt Yugoslav Power Grid,” Washington Post , May 25, 1999.

[89]Ibid.

[90]William Drozdiak, “Allies Target Computer, Phone Links,” Washington Post , May 27, 1999.

[91]Ignatieff, “The Virtual Commander,” p. 35.

[92]James Gerstenzang and Elizabeth Shogren, “Serb TV Airs Footage of 3 Captured U.S. Soldiers,” Los Angeles Times , April 1, 1999.

[93]On that account, Clark later acknowledged that his air commanders were no happier than he was with the absence of a ground threat, noting that it was “sort of an unnatural act for airmen to fight a ground war without a ground component.” Ignatieff, “The Virtual Commander,” p. 33.

[94]Paul Richter, “Use of Ground Troops Not Fully Ruled Out,” Los Angeles Times , March 29, 1999.

[95]Rowan Scarborough, “Military Experts See a Need for Ground Troops,” Washington Times , March 30, 1999.

[96]Rowan Scarborough, “Momentum for Troops Growing,” Washington Times , April 5, 1999.

[97]John F. Harris, “Clinton Says He Might Send Ground Troops,” Washington Post , May 19, 1999. In an earlier attempt at revisionism, Secretary of State Albright upbraided an interviewer by flatly declaring that “we never expected this to be over quickly,” in complete contradiction to her categorical pronouncement the first night of the air war 11 days earlier that “I think that this is something, the deter and damage, is something that is achievable within a relatively short time.” John Harris, “Reassuring Rhetoric, Reality in Conflict,” Washington Post , April 8, 1999.

[98]Dan Balz, “U.S. Consensus Grows to Send in Ground Troops,” Washington Post , April 6, 1999.

[99]Clark, Waging Modern War , p. 303. As a testament to the depth of his conviction on the criticality of getting serious about laying the groundwork for a land invasion, Clark in mid‑May wrote a letter to Secretary General Solana which, he said, “demonstrated at length how moving into ground‑force preparations would exponentially increase [NATO’s] leverage against Milosevic.” Ibid, pp. 307–308, emphasis added.

[100]Interview by RAND staff, Washington, D.C., June 11, 2000. The UK Ministry of Defense’s director of operations in Allied Force, Air Marshal Sir John Day, however, later commented that there was never much military enthusiasm for a double envelopment through Hungary. Conversation with Air Marshal Day, RAF Innsworth, United Kingdom, July 26, 2000.

[101]Thomas W. Lippman and Bradley Graham, “NATO Chief Asks Review of Invasion Planning,” Washington Post , April 22, 1999.

[102]Eric Schmitt and Michael R. Gordon, “British Pressing Partners to Deploy Ground Troops,” New York Times , May 18, 1999.

[103]Richard Morin, “Poll Shows Most Americans Want Negotiations on Kosovo,” Washington Post , May 18, 1999.

[104]Carla Anne Robbins and Thomas E. Ricks, “Time Is Running Out If Invasion Is to Remain Option Before Winter,” Wall Street Journal , May 21, 1999.

[105]Conversation with Air Marshal Sir John Day, RAF, UK Ministry of Defense director of operations in Allied Force, RAF Innsworth, United Kingdom, July 26, 2000.

[106]Ibid.

[107]Richard J. Newman, “U.S. Troops Edge Closer to Kosovo,” U.S. News and World Report , June 7, 1999.

[108]Interview by RAND staff, Washington, D.C., July 11, 2000.

[109]The 15,000‑ft restriction was never done away with over Serbia and Montenegro, however, and over Kosovo it was eased only for FACs and for some weapon deliveries in selected circumstances.

[110]Hewson, “Allied Force, Part II,” p. 102.

[111]R. Jeffrey Smith and Dana Priest, “Yugoslavia Near Goals in Kosovo,” Washington Post , May 11, 1999.

[112]Hewson, “Allied Force, Part II,” p. 109.

[113]Ibid., p. 110.

[114]Robert Burns, “Use of Apache Copters Is Not Expected Soon,” Philadelphia Inquirer , May 19, 1999. In what may have been intended as an attempt to lessen the sting of this leadership ruling, one Army source suggested that sending the Apaches in had been meant all along merely as a scare tactic to induce Milosevic to negotiate. The source added that if they had really been intended to be used, the more modern and capable Apache Longbows would have been deployed instead. “Obviously, it was just for show, not for go.” Rowan Scarborough, “Apaches Were Sent to Scare Serbs,” Washington Times , May 21, 1999.

[115]The Block D version of the B‑1 employed in Allied Force was configured to carry the GBU‑31 joint direct attack munition (JDAM), but only the B‑2 actually delivered that still‑scarce munition.

[116]It bears noting here that the highly effective GAU‑8 30mm cannon carried by the A‑10 saw use only 156 times in Allied Force because of the extreme slant range that was required by the 5,000‑ft altitude restriction (comments on an earlier draft by Hq USAFE/SA, April 6, 2001). At that range, the principal problem for today’s A‑10 pilots is not hitting the target; it is seeing the target. At a 30‑degree dive angle from 5,000 ft, the slant range to target is 10,000 ft.

[117]Glenn Burkins, “Serbs Intensify Effort to Down Allied Warplanes,” Wall Street Journal , May 28, 1999. In the second instance, the ABCCC drew on instantly accessible satellite photos and maps maintained in a National Imagery and Mapping Agency computerized database to identify potential obstacles, such as power lines, in order to plot a safe course for the rescue helicopter that recovered the downed pilot. Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, “Inside the Ring,” Washington Times , May 19, 2000. Although there was definitely a pronounced increase in enemy SAM activity during the night of May 27 in an apparent effort to down a NATO pilot at any cost, it bears stressing that there were no nights during Allied Force without at least a few SAM shots, approximately 35 nights with 10 or more shots, and at least 13 nights with 20 or more shots. The highest number of shots observed (significantly higher than the number observed on May 27) was on the night of the F‑16 loss. Overall, enemy SAM activity levels tracked closely with allied air attack levels. Low‑observable and cruise‑missile‑only strikes prompted little enemy IADS reaction, whereas trolling for SAMs with F‑16CJs and CGs and large conventional attack packages always generated a proportionately large enemy reaction. This trend remained consistent throughout the air war from start to finish. Comments on an earlier draft by Hq USAFE/IN, May 18, 2001.

[118]Alessandra Stanley, “Albanian Fighters Say They Aid NATO in Spotting Serb Targets,” New York Times , April 2, 1999.

[119]Dana Priest and Peter Finn, “NATO Gives Air Support to Kosovo Guerrillas,” Washington Post , June 2, 1999.

[120]Marjorie Miller, “KLA Vows to Disarm If NATO Occupies Kosovo,” Los Angeles Times , June 7, 1999.

[121]Matthew Kaminski and John Reed, “NATO Link to KLA Rebels May Have Helped Seal Victory,” Wall Street Journal , July 6, 1999.

[122]William Drozdiak and Anne Swardson, “Military, Diplomatic Offensives Bring About Accord,” Washington Post , June 4, 1999.

[123]Tony Capaccio, “JSTARS Led Most Lethal Attacks on Serbs,” Defense Week , July 6, 1999, p. 13.

[124]Michael R. Gordon, “A War out of the Night Sky: 10 Hours with a Battle Team,” New York Times , June 3, 1999.

[125]Comments on an earlier draft by Ivo Daalder of the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., March 15, 2001. Daalder previously served as director for European affairs on the National Security Council staff in 1995 and 1996, where he was responsible for coordinating U.S. policy for Bosnia.

[126]Daniel Williams and Bradley Graham, “Yugoslavs Yield to NATO Terms,” Washington Post , June 4, 1999.

[127]R. Jeffrey Smith and Molly Moore, “Plan for Kosovo Pullout Signed,” Washington Post , June 10, 1999.

[128]William Drozdiak, “Yugoslav Troops Devastated by Attack,” Washington Post , June 9, 1999.

[129]Smith and Moore, “Plan for Kosovo Pullout Signed.”

[130]At one point in the negotiations, the VJ military delegation leader, Colonel General Svetozar Marjanovic, abruptly walked out of the talks, stating that he needed to “consult with authorities in Belgrade.” He made it only to a border post and returned to the negotiating table within an hour.

[131]Tim Weiner, “From President, Victory Speech and a Warning,” New York Times , June 11, 1999.

[132]See Julian Barger, “Bloody Paper Chain May Link Torture to Milosevic,” The Guardian , June 18, 1999.

[133]Ian Black and John Hooper, “Serb Savagery Exposed,” The Guardian , June 18, 1999.

[134]Michael R. Gordon and Eric Schmitt, “Shift in Targets Let NATO Jets Tip the Balance,” New York Times , June 5, 1999.

[135]Weiner, “From President, Victory Speech and a Warning.”

[136]Bradley Graham, “Air Power ‘Effective, Successful,’ Cohen Says,” Washington Post , June 11, 1999.

[137]Operation Allied Force and Operation Joint Guardian briefing charts dated August 19, 1999, provided to the author by Air Marshal Sir John Day, RAF, UK Ministry of Defense director of operations in Allied Force, RAF Innsworth, United Kingdom, July 25, 2000.

[138]Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Henry H. Shelton, Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After‑Action Report , Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, Report to Congress, January 31, 2000, p. 87.

[139]Ibid., p. 68.

[140]Operation Allied Force and Operation Joint Guardian briefing charts dated August 19, 1999.

[141]“AWOS Fact Sheet,” Hq USAFE/SA, December 17, 1999. See also William M. Arkin, “Top Air Force Leaders to Get Briefed on Serbia Air War Report,” Defense Daily , June 13, 2000, p. 1. As attested by cockpit display videotapes released to the press throughout the air war, allied air attacks succeeded in taking out quite a few more SA‑6 launchers than those accounted for here. However, since the STRAIGHT FLUSH radar formed the core of an SA‑6 battery, the battery was considered operational until the STRAIGHT FLUSH was destroyed. Comments on an earlier draft by Hq USAFE/IN, May 18, 2001.

[142]John A. Tirpak, “Lessons Learned and Re‑Learned,” Air Force Magazine , August 1999, p. 23.

[143]Andrew Gilligan, “Russia, Not Bombs, Brought End to War in Kosovo, Says Jackson,” London Sunday Telegraph , August 1, 1999. To his credit, Jackson did later testify to the Commons Defense Committee of Britain’s parliament that “the effect of the strategic bombing, I suspect, was much weightier than the damage being done to the [Serb] army in Kosovo.” “General Admits NATO Exaggerated Bombing Success,” London Times , May 11, 2000.

[144]Michael Ignatieff, “The Virtual Commander: How NATO Invented a New Kind of War,” The New Yorker , August 2, 1999, p. 31.

[145]See, for example, Rebecca Grant, “Air Power Made It Work,” Air Force Magazine , November 1999, pp. 30–37.

[146]Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo , Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 2000, p. 184.

[147]This official, in an interview with RAND staff members in Washington on June 11, 2000, further claimed that the White House was not surprised when Milosevic accepted the deal on June 3, since the administration was confident that once Chernomyrdin had agreed to NATO’s terms, it was merely a matter of time before a successful denouement would be reached, considering that Chernomyrdin knew Milosevic’s bottom line and would not have signed up for any arrangement that he knew Milosevic would not accept. What was surprising, the official said, was that Milosevic did not first seek to buy time by proffering more “half‑loaf” compromise deals.

[148]Daniel Williams and Bradley Graham, “Milosevic Admits to Losses of Personnel,” Washington Post , May 13, 1999.

[149]Interview with Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, “Milosevic Is Far Weaker Now,” USA Today , May 14, 1999.

[150]Paul Richter, “Officials Say NATO Pounded Milosevic into Submission,” Los Angeles Times , June 5, 1999. The possible effects of the bombing on what one might call second‑tier Serb leaders are especially noteworthy, in that they suggest that the elite substructure of an enemy’s hierarchy may make for more lucrative leadership targets than the “big guys.” Unlike the topmost political leaders, these second‑tier individuals have “retirement plans,” in that they have options to recoup their interests under a new regime. They thus may be more malleable than their bosses, even as they are often critical to their bosses’ survival. I am grateful to Colonel Robert Owen, USAF, for having suggested this intriguing idea to me.

[151]Doyle McManus, “Clinton’s Massive Ground Invasion That Almost Was,” Los Angeles Times , June 9, 2000. A persistent concern that tended to inhibit a truly aggressive use of such information entailed the liability implications of information attacks against foreign bank accounts, as well as official worries about the Pandora’s box that might be opened if the United States began playing that game, thus rendering its own economy susceptible to similar measures in return.

[152]Tom Walker, “Bomb Video Took Fight out of Milosevic,” London Sunday Times , January 30, 2000.

[153]Dana Priest, “A Decisive Battle That Never Was,” Washington Post , September 19, 1999.

[154]Patrick Wintour and Peter Beaumont, “Revealed: The Secret Plan to Invade Kosovo,”London Sunday Observer , July 18, 1999.

[155]Peter Beaumont and Patrick Wintour, “Leaks in NATO–and Plan Bravo Minus,” London Sunday Observer , July 18, 1999.

[156]Michael R. Gordon, “NATO Says Serbs, Fearing Land War, Dig In on Border,” New York Times , May 19, 1999.

[157]Jane Perlez, “Clinton and the Joint Chiefs to Discuss Ground Invasion,” New York Times , June 2, 1999.

[158]For details, see Steven Erlanger, “NATO Was Closer to Ground War in Kosovo Than Is Widely Realized,” New York Times , November 7, 1999.

[159]McManus, “Clinton’s Massive Ground Invasion That Almost Was.” NATO commanders were asking for three months to assemble the invasion force.

[160]A recent example of this countercontention dismissed the claims of unspecified “air power enthusiasts” and posited instead that “the decision to commit ground forces [a decision which, in fact, had not been made at the time of Milosevic’s capitulation] was critical to NATO’s success.” Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege, USA (Ret.) and Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II, USA, “Precision Decisions: To Build a Balanced Force, the QDR Might Consider These Four Propositions,” Armed Forces Journal Internationa l, October 2000, p. 54.

[161]General Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat , New York, Public Affairs, 2001, pp. 305, 425, emphasis added.

[162]The most compelling of such evidence cited by Clark was the May 28 statement by Secretary of Defense Cohen, made less than a week before Milosevic capitulated, that “there is no consensus for a ground force. And until there is a consensus, we should not undertake any action for which we could not measure up in the way of performance…. And so, there is a very serious question in terms of trying to push for a consensus that you really diffuse or in any way diminish the commitment to the air campaign. The one thing we have to continue is to make sure we have the allies consolidated in strong support of the air campaign. They are. And they are in favor of its intensification. So that’s where we intend to put the emphasis.” Ibid, p. 332.

[163]However, by dispersing their assets and selectively emitting with their radars, Serb IADS operators forced NATO aircrews to remain wary to the very end and denied them the freedom to operate at will in hostile airspace. Although the Serbs’ repeated attempts to bring down NATO aircraft frequently came in the form of ineffective ballistic launches, the launches were amply disconcerting to allied pilots, who were forced to threat‑react–often aggressively–to ensure their own safety. Many guided shots in accordance with IADS doctrine were also fired against attacking allied aircraft, requiring even more aggressive and hair‑raising countertactics by the targeted aircraft. A first‑hand account of one such episode is reported in Dave Moniz, “Eye‑to‑Eye with a New Kind of War,” Christian Science Monitor , March 23, 2000.

[164]Quoted in Tyler Marshall and Richard Boudreaux, “Crisis in Yugoslavia: How an Uneasy Alliance Prevailed,” Los Angeles Times , June 6, 1999.

[165]Daniel L. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, “Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate,” International Security , Spring 2000, p. 15.

[166]General John Jumper, USAF, “Oral Histories Accomplished in Conjunction with Operation Allied Force/Noble Anvil.”

[167]Stephen T. Hosmer, The Conflict over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did , Santa Monica, California, RAND, MR‑1351‑AF, 2001.

[168]The latter of these two concerns was more an issue for Milosevic than the former. Had he been seriously worried about a NATO presence that might actually encroach into Serbia, as opposed to just taking effective control of Kosovo (his real fear), he would have sought to head off that possibility at Rambouillet. He never did. I am grateful to Ivo Daalder of the Brookings Institution for bringing this point to my attention.

[169]Justin Brown, “Why U.S. Bombs Failed to Topple Milosevic,” Christian Science Monitor , March 24, 2000.

[170]See, in particular, Colonel Robert Owen, USAF, ed., Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning , Maxwell AFB, Alabama, Air University Press, January 2000, pp. 455–522.

[171]Stephen Hosmer has pointed out that the ethnic cleansing hardened NATO’s resolve in another way as well: Only a NATO military presence in Kosovo would have convinced the refugees to go back to their homes, and no outcome short of the latter would have been acceptable to NATO.