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[297]Tim Butcher and Patrick Bishop, “NATO Admits Air Campaign Failed,” London Daily Telegraph , July 22, 1999.

[298]John Barry, “The Kosovo Cover‑Up,” Newsweek , May 15, 2000, p. 23.

[299]Richard J. Newman, “The Bombs That Failed in Kosovo,” U.S. News and World Report , September 20, 1999.

[300]Stephen P. Aubin, “Newsweek and the 14 Tanks,” Air Force Magazine , July 2000, pp. 59–61. As USAFE’s director of studies and analysis, Brigadier General John Corley, who directed that assessment, explained afterward during a Pentagon press briefing, “if a pilot claimed that he had attacked a tank at a given [location], we would go to that location and… begin to survey that exact site. If what we had was… multiple sources to confirm what had been claimed, then we would put that into a successful strike category. Let me give you an example. If we went to one of those desired mean points of impact and we found a bomb crater and we found shrapnel and oil down in the bottom of that bomb crater, then we would take a digitized photo of that crater and we would note that there would be earth scarring, as if some very heavy piece of equipment had been dragged from that bomb crater out to a road. Then we would compare that with both before and after imagery. You might have, for example, a [satellite] image showing a tank in a tree line. You may go and take a look at the cockpit video which shows that tank at that exact set of coordinates with a munition impacting it…. You may then go back and discover a piece of U‑2 film afterward showing a damaged tank. You may then find out that an airborne forward air controller who had flown specifically over this area day in and day out would report that approximately two to three days later, whatever had been there was now gone from that location. We further wound up with some information whereby we saw bomb‑damaged and destroyed equipment loaded on board flatbed trucks being taken out of Kosovo, headed back north into Serbia. So as you begin to look at all those sources of information, those multiple layers worth… in concert, and if we had multiple pieces of evidentiary information, we would confirm a successful strike. And that was the difference between the 26 and the 93. If we could not confirm with multiple sources, we did not claim a successful strike.” News briefing, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., May 8, 2000.

[301]Indeed, in its interim report on the Kosovo air effort, the USAF expressly conceded that “shortfalls remain… in the USAF’s ability to locate and attack moving armor and other ground forces in poor weather. The Air Force needs to continue to develop and improve its ability to do this.” The Air War Over Serbia: Aerospace Power in Operation Allied Force , Washington, D.C., Hq United States Air Force, April 1, 2000, p. 53.

[302]Cohen and Shelton, After‑Action Report , p. 56.

[303]Dana Priest, “Tension Grew with Divide in Strategy,” Washington Post , September 21, 1999.

[304]Ignatieff, Virtual War , p. 106.

[305]This is not to suggest that one should draw any particular comfort from the apparent fact that NATO’s failure to take out more than a token number of VJ tanks was largely irrelevant to the overall outcome of Allied Force. For one thing, had NATO been able to render the VJ’s Kosovo corps ineffective during the air war’s initial month, Milosevic may well have capitulated earlier, to the relief of both NATO and the Kosovar Albanians. Second, and more important, the mission of finding, identifying, and destroying dispersed and concealed enemy tanks is not going to go away, and the U.S. Air Force will likely be asked again in some future contingency to attack fielded enemy forces under comparably challenging circumstances. Civilians in senior leadership positions who recall the more optimistic early claims on behalf of the air war’s accomplishments in this respect will naturally expect air power to perform effectively. Fortunately, despite charges from some that the Air Force sought to play down its difficulties in this regard in the early aftermath of Allied Force, its leadership has frankly owned up to those difficulties and has initiated measures aimed at improving its capability. I am grateful to my RAND colleague Bruce Pirnie for directing my attention to this point.

[306]Joel Havemann, “Convoy Deaths May Undermine Moral Authority,” Los Angeles Times , April 15, 1999.

[307]Indeed, the train entered the AGM‑130’s field of regard so close to the moment of weapon impact that the F‑15E weapon systems officer (WSO) who was controlling the guiding weapon noted that he had not even seen it until the videotape of his cockpit display was played back during the subsequent mission debriefing. As a measure of the extent to which F‑15E aircrews, like all others, were disciplined to honor the strictest collateral‑damage avoidance rules, there were numerous instances in which the WSO dragged the selected impact point of a guiding AGM‑130 off the designated aim point to an open area at the last moment because the target looked through the weapon’s EO seeker head like a house or some other potential opportunity for collateral damage. In a similar illustration of such discipline, one videotape of an AGM‑130 attack on an enemy fuel storage tank as the weapon neared impact showed the targeted tank to be empty while others around it were full. Nevertheless, despite the WSO’s natural temptation, the guiding weapon was not slewed at the last moment toward a more lucrative target because the empty fuel tank happened to be the one to which the approved DMPI had been assigned. Conversation with USAF F‑15E aircrews, 492nd Fighter Squadron, RAF Lakenheath, England, April 27, 2001.

[308]Rowan Scarborough, “As Strikes Mount, So Do Errors,” Washington Times , May 11, 1999.

[309]Robert Wall, “NATO Shifts Tactics to Attack Ground Forces,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , April 12, 1999, p. 23.

[310]Michael Dobbs and Karl Vick, “Air Strikes Kill Scores of Refugees,” Washington Post , April 15, 1999.

[311]Videotaped press statement by Brigadier General Daniel Leaf, USAF, Brussels, Belgium, NATO Office of Information and Press, April 19, 1999.

[312]Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Lessons and Non‑Lessons of the Air and Missile War in Kosovo,” unpublished draft, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., July 20, 1999.

[313]Typical of such baseless charges was the reference by one pundit to the “low altitudes at which tactical attacks work,” yet where “pilots risk getting killed” (William Pfaff, “After NATO’s Lies About Kosovo, It’s Time to Come Clean,” International Herald Tribune , May 11, 2000) and the allegation by another that “avoiding risk to pilots multiplied the risk to civilians exponentially” (James Carroll, “The Truth About NATO’s Air War,” Boston Globe , June 20, 2000).

[314]Edward N. Luttwak, “Give War a Chance,” Foreign Affairs , July/August 1999, p. 40.

[315]“NATO Jets May Have Erred in Convoy Attack, General Says,” Aerospace Daily , April 20, 1999, p. 102.

[316]John A. Tirpak, “The State of Precision Engagement,” Air Force Magazine , March 2000, p. 26.

[317]It further bears stressing in this regard that most cases of unintended damage resulting in civilian deaths occurred inside targeted buildings, which were prespecified in the ATO and against which NATO aircrews were not free to exercise real‑time discretion. Other such cases were occasioned by munitions failures such as faulty cluster‑bomb fuses or laser target designators that were disrupted by smoke or clouds while a weapon was guiding. Neither had anything to do with weapon‑release altitude. The only clear case of noncombatant fatalities that can be even indirectly ascribed to altitude was the April 14 Djakovica convoy incident, during which the attack was immediately called off once the target identification error was discovered.

[318]Email from Lieutenant Colonel James Tubbs, AF/XPXQ, to Colonel James Callard, AF/XPXS, February 11, 2000. Lieutenant Colonel Tubbs was the operations officer of the 510th Fighter Squadron flying F‑16CGs out of Aviano Air Base during Operation Allied Force.

[319]Although, as in Desert Storm, AWACS generally provided a superb threat picture to allied pilots operating in hostile airspace, at least one specific instance of friction was reported by a USAF F‑15C pilot who downed a Yugoslav MiG‑29 during a day defensive counterair mission on March 26. The pilot complained that the supporting AWACS controller “did not have any inkling [that] someone was flying on the other side of the border, although he was real good at calling out every friendly west of us” (email communication to the author, June 4, 1999). The F‑15 pilot further charged that the supporting AWACS was still unaware of the MiG‑29’s presence even after initial moves had commenced. The intercepting pilot accordingly assessed the assumed threat aircraft to be hostile by origin, since there were no NATO offensive counterair missions airborne at the time. Only after the engagement was fully joined and the F‑15 pilot had visually confirmed his target to be a MiG‑29 did the AWACS controller finally report two possible hostile contacts in lead‑trail formation.

[320]The error was also reminiscent of earlier damage to the French embassy in Tripoli, Libya, in 1986 during the joint U.S. Air Force–U.S. Navy Operation El Dorado Canyon against Libya’s ruler, Moammar Khaddafi, caused when the bomb fragmentation pattern from a preceding F‑111 forced the trailing pilot to shift course, inadvertently sending his bombs into the embassy. That, however, was an operational error occasioned by the heat of battle, not a planning error committed by target nominators.

[321]David A. Fulghum and Robert Wall, “Intel Mistakes Trigger Chinese Embassy Bombing,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , May 17, 1999, p. 55.

[322]Eric Schmitt, “Aim, Not Arms, at the Root of Mistaken Strike on Embassy,” New York Times , May 10, 1999.

[323]Paul Richter and Doyle McManus, “Pentagon to Tighten Targeting Procedures,” Los Angeles Times , May 11, 1999.

[324]Vernon Loeb and Steven Mufson, “CIA Analyst Raised Alert on China’s Embassy,” Washington Post , June 24, 1999.

[325]Eric Schmitt, “Pentagon Admits Its Maps of Belgrade Are Out of Date,” New York Times , May 11, 1999, and Bradley Graham, “U.S. Analysts Misread, Relied on Outdated Maps,” Washington Post , May 11, 1999.

[326]Steven Pearlstein, “NATO Bomb Said to Hit Belgrade Hospital,” Washington Post , May 21, 1999.

[327]Steven Lee Myers, “Chinese Embassy Bombing: A Wide Net of Blame,” New York Times , April 17, 2000.

[328]Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo , Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 2000, p. 147.

[329]Another reported problem with the Macedonia basing option was the fact that it would have been a violation of the Dayton accords to station any offensive forces within the territorial confines of the former Yugoslavia. Albania was thus the only realistic alternative.

[330]Bradley Graham and Dana Priest, “Allies to Begin Flying Refugees Abroad,” Washington Post , April 5, 1999.

[331]That said, it bears noting that the threat of Serbian forces coming across the Albanian border did not appear to be a matter of great concern to anyone in the Allied Force command hierarchy before the arrival of TF Hawk, even though there were U.S. troops already on the ground in Albania as a part of JTF Shining Hope, the Albanian refugee relief effort, who were not provided with any comparable force‑protection package.

[332]Elaine M. Grossman, “Army’s Cold War Orientation Slowed Apache Deployment to Balkans,” Inside the Pentagon , May 6, 1999, p. 6. Notably, the C‑17 demonstrated for the first time the ability to air‑deliver a significant Army force of M1 tanks, M2 AFVs, MLRSs, howitzers, and engineering equipment.

[333]Paul Richter and Lisa Getter, “Mechanical Error, Pilot Error Led to Apache Crashes,” Los Angeles Times , May 13, 1999.

[334]Ron Lorenzo, “Apache Deployment Has Cost Quarter Billion So Far,” Defense Week , June 7, 1999, p. 6.

[335]Molly Moore and Bradley Graham, “NATO Plans for Peace, Not Ground Invasion,” Washington Post , May 17, 1999.

[336]Sheila Foote, “Shelton: Risk Was the Key in Decision Not to Use Apaches,” Defense Daily , September 10, 1999, p. 2.

[337]True enough, the terrain and weather presented by Kosovo were more challenging than the open and featureless Iraqi desert, where the Apaches had performed so effectively against enemy armor in Desert Storm. Yet the biggest concern in the minds of many U.S. leaders was the specter of a replay of the 1993 “Bloody Sunday” horror in Mogadishu, Somalia, with dead Army Rangers and crewmembers from downed Black‑hawk helicopters being dragged through the streets on live television worldwide.

[338]David Atkinson and Hunter Keeter, “Apache Role in Kosovo Illustrates Cracks in Joint Doctrine,” Defense Daily , May 26, 1999, p. 6.

[339]Quoted in Elaine M. Grossman, “As Apaches Near Combat, White House Seeks Diplomatic Solution,” Inside the Pentagon , May 6, 1999, p. 7.

[340]Telephone conversation with Lieutenant General Michael Short, USAF (Ret.), August 22, 2001.

[341]Elaine M. Grossman, “Army Commander in Albania Resists Joint Control over Apache Missions,” Inside the Pentagon , May 20, 1999, p. 9. In his memoirs, Clark later scored this article for “personally attacking Jay Hendrix and claiming, among other accusations, that he would not allow the Apache sorties to appear on Short’s Air Tasking Order.” Clark made no attempt to refute that accusation, however, but merely dismissed it as the complaint of a “disgruntled Air Force officer” whose “misunderstanding, communicated without perspective to friends in other units, suddenly surfaced to make news weeks after it had been written, after the problems it addressed, if real then, had been corrected.” General Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat , New York, Public Affairs, 2001, p. 320.

[342]Major General John Dallager, USAF, “NATO JFACC Doctrine,” briefing at a conference on “The NATO Joint Force Air Component Commander Concept in Light of the Kosovo Air Campaign,” Headquarters NATO Reaction Force Air Staff, Kalkar, Germany, December 1–3, 1999. It might be noted in passing here that another Army–Air Force difference of view that had an even greater operational impact than the joint doctrinal disagreement discussed above (because all involved had to live through its consequences) was the disconnect between the two services at Tirana as to who was in charge of the airfield and force protection, a disconnect that, according to one senior USAF planner who was involved, created “some real problems.” Comments on an earlier draft by Brigadier General Robert Bishop, Hq USAF/XOO, April 17, 2001.

[343]Ibid.

[344]George C. Wilson, “Memo Says Apaches, Pilots Were Not Ready,” European Stars and Stripes , June 20, 1999.

[345]Thomas E. Ricks, “Why the U.S. Army Is Ill‑Equipped to Move Troops Quickly into Kosovo,” Wall Street Journal , April 16, 1999. The most fully developed and widely cited articulation of this proposed Army reorganization, which failed to take root, may be found in Colonel Douglas A. Macgregor, USA, Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century , Westport, Connecticut, Praeger, 1997.

[346]Eric Schmitt, “New Army Chief Seeks More Agility and Power,” New York Times , June 24, 1999.

[347]“Shinseki Hints at Restructuring, Aggressive Changes for the Army,” Inside the Army , June 28, 1999, p. 1.

[348]Lieutenant General Theodore G. Stroup, Jr., USA (Ret.), “Task Force Hawk: Beyond Expectations,” Army Magazine , August 1999.

[349]Response to a question at an Air Force Association Eaker Institute colloquy, “Operation Allied Force: Strategy, Execution, Implications,” held at the Ronald Reagan International Trade Center, Washington, D.C., August 16, 1999.

[350]Comments on an earlier draft by Brigadier General Robert Bishop, Hq USAF/XOO, April 12, 2001, and Colonel Robert Owen, Hq AMC, May 10, 2001. See also General Charles T. Robertson, Jr., USAF, commander in chief, U.S. Transportation Command, and commander, Air Mobility Command, “Air War Over Serbia: A Mobility Perspective,” briefing charts, 2000, Hq USAFE/SA library.

[351]The AGM‑130 is a rocket‑boosted variant of the electro‑optical and infrared guided GBU‑15 2,000‑lb PGM featuring midcourse GPS guidance updates. At the start of the air war, 200 of these weapons had been fielded, and those used were pulled from Air Combat Command’s Weapons System Evaluation Program (WSEP), leaving no munitions for training. William M. Arkin, “Kosovo Report Short on Weapons Performance Details,” Defense Daily , February 10, 2000, p. 2.

[352]Ibid.

[353]Lieutenant General Marvin R. Esmond, testimony to the Military Procurement Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee, Washington, D.C., October 19, 1999.

[354]David A. Fulghum, “Lessons Learned May Be Flawed,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , June 14, 1999, p. 205.

[355]Rowan Scarborough, “Kosovo Target Data Stalled in Transit,” Washington Times , July 28, 1999.

[356]Tim Ripley, “Tanker Operations,” World Air Power Journal , Winter 1999/2000, p. 121.

[357]Wall, “Airspace Control Challenges Allies.”

[358]Colonel E. Baldazzi, Italian Air Force, “Host Nation Support for the Kosovo Air Campaign,” briefing at a conference on “The NATO Joint Force Air Component Commander Concept in Light of the Kosovo Air Campaign,” Headquarters NATO Reaction Force Air Staff, Kalkar, Germany, December 1–3, 1999.

[359]Joseph Fitchett, “For NATO, Keeping Peak Air Traffic on the Go Was a Critical Goal,” International Herald Tribune , March 31, 2000.

[360]“Space Support to Operation Allied Force: Preliminary Lessons Learned,” briefing to the author by Colonel Robert Bivins, director of operations, U.S. Air Force Space Warfare Center, Schriever AFB, Colorado, February 25, 2000.

[361]Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, “Dangerous Drawdown,” Washington Times , April 30, 1999.

[362]“Space Support to Operation Allied Force: Preliminary Lessons Learned,” briefing by Colonel Robert Bivins, February 25, 2000.

[363]Roy Bender, “Allies Still Lack Real‑Time Retargeting,” Jane’s Defense Weekly , April 7, 1999.

[364]John Donnelly, “NRO Chief: Services Ill‑Prepared to Work with Spy Satellites,” Defense Week , July 12, 1999, p. 2.

[365]Quoted in The Air War Over Serbia , p. 53.

[366]For a fuller treatment of the allied contribution to the air war and the interoperability problems that became manifest as a result of it, see John E. Peters, Stuart Johnson, Nora Bensahel, Timothy Liston, and Traci Williams, European Contributions to Operation Allied Force: Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation , Santa Monica, California, RAND, MR‑1391‑AF, 2001.

[367]Since allied aircraft could not receive Have Quick radio transmissions and since enemy forces made no effort to jam allied UHF communications, which Have Quick was expressly developed to counter, the Have Quick capability was not used by U.S. combat aircrews during Allied Force.

[368]“NATO Jets May Have Erred in Convoy Attack, General Says,” p. 102.

[369]David A. Fulghum and Robert Wall, “Data Link, EW Problems Pinpointed by Pentagon,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , September 6, 1999, pp. 87–88. The JTIDS offers aircrews a planform view of their tactical situation, as well as a capability for real‑time exchange of digital information between aircraft on relative positions, weapons availability, and fuel states, among other things. It further shows the position of all aircraft in a formation, as well as the location of enemy aircraft and ground threats. Fighters can receive this information passively, without highlighting themselves through radio voice communications. See William B. Scott, “JTIDS Provides F‑15Cs ‘God’s Eye View,’” Aviation Week and Space Technology , April 29, 1996, p. 63.

[370]John D. Morrocco, “Kosovo Reveals NATO Interoperability Woes,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , August 9, 1999, p. 32.

[371]Barton Gellman and William Drozdiak, “Conflict Halts Momentum for Broader Agenda,” Washington Post , June 6, 1999.

[372]Conversation with Major General P. J. M. Godderij, deputy commander in chief, RNLAF, Scheveningen, the Netherlands, June 7, 2000.

[373]Chris Pocock, “Mirage IV Reconnaissance Missions,” World Air Power Journal , Winter 1999/2000, p. 111.

[374]Rowan Scarborough, “Record Deployments Take Toll on Military,” Washington Times , March 28, 2000.

[375]Hewson, “Operation Allied Force,” p. 21.

[376]The principal deputy assistant secretary of the Air Force for acquisition at the time, then–Lieutenant General Gregory Martin, acknowledged that the shortage of JDAMs was the result of a conscious choice made five years ago to emphasize other procurement needs. David A. Fulghum, “Bomb Shortage Was No Mistake,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , May 17, 1999, p. 55.

[377]See Rowan Scarborough, “Smaller U.S. Military Is Spread Thin,” Washington Times , March 31, 1999.

[378]Ibid.

[379]Bradley Graham, “General Says U.S. Readiness Is Ailing,” Washington Post , April 30, 1999.

[380]Ibid.

[381]John A. Tirpak, “The First Six Weeks,” Air Force Magazine , June 1999, p. 27.

[382]“U.S. Mobilizes Guard, Reserve for Balkan Duty,” Air Force Magazine , June 1999, p. 16.

[383]Vince Crawley, “Air Force Needs 90 Days Between Wars, Chief Says,” Defense Week , August 9, 1999, p. 12.

[384]Tirpak, “The First Six Weeks,” p. 27.

[385]John T. Correll, “Assumptions Fall in Kosovo,” Air Force Magazine , June 1999, p. 4.

[386]Characteristics of LD/HD include single‑unit asset, limited numbers of aircraft and pilots, and likely tasking in more than one theater. Joint Vision 2010, the “revolution in military affairs,” improved sensor to shooter links, and decisive attack operations all depend on more support to LD/HD assets. They transcend individual service and weapon system boundaries.

[387]Dale Eisman, “Kosovo Lesson: Navy Says It Needs More High‑Tech Tools,” Norfolk Virginian‑Pilot , June 10, 1999.

[388]Greg Seigle, “Prowler Jammers Used to Aid NATO Air Assault,” Jane’s Defense Weekly , March 31, 1999.

[389]Edmund L. Andrews, “Aboard Advanced Radar Flight, U.S. Watches Combat Zone,” New York Times , June 14, 1999.

[390]Briefing by Admiral James O. Ellis, USN, commander in chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, and commander, Allied Forces Southern Europe and Joint Task Force Noble Anvil, “The View from the Top,” 1999.

[391]Elizabeth Becker, “Needed on Several Fronts, U.S. Jet Force Is Strained,” New York Times , April 6, 1999.

[392]Comments on an earlier draft by Hq USAF/XOXS, July 9, 1999.

[393]Kate O’Beirne, “Defenseless: The Military’s Hollow Ring,” National Review , May 3, 1999, p. 18.

[394]Paul Richter, “U.S. Study of War on Yugoslavia Aimed at Boosting Performance,” Los Angeles Times , July 10, 1999.

[395]In fairness to the Clinton administration, it must be said that bombing the Bosnian Serbs unilaterally was not a realistic option for the United States as long as three NATO allies (France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) had troops on the ground who would have been helpless against Serb reprisals had U.S. air strikes taken place. It was only after the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) pulled back into defensible positions so that the Serbs could not take its troops hostage that Operation Deliberate Force became politically feasible. Weakness on the ground can often negate strength in the air.

[396]For an informed, if also sharply judgmental, account of this history, see Joshua Muravchik, “The Road to Kosovo, Commentary , June 1999, pp. 17–23. See also Lieutenant Colonel Paul K. White, USAF, Crises After the Storm: An Appraisal of U.S. Air Operations in Iraq Since the Persian Gulf War , Military Research Papers No. 2, Washington, D.C., Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1999.

[397]Rowan Scarborough, “U.S. Pilots Call NATO Targeting a ‘Disgrace,’” Washington Times , April 1, 1999.

[398]John D. Morrocco, David Fulghum, and Robert Wall, “Weather, Weapons Dearth Slow NATO Strikes,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , April 5, 1999, p. 26.

[399]William M. Arkin, “Inside the Air Force, Officers Are Frustrated About the Air War,” Washington Post , April 25, 1999.

[400]To illustrate, Clark recalled after the cease‑fire that he would often have to call Solana at the last minute with an urgent request like: “You’ve got to help me with target 183. I need 183.” Michael Ignatieff, “The Virtual Commander: How NATO Invented a New Kind of War,” The New Yorker , August 2, 1999, p. 34.

[401]Ibid.

[402]Roundtable discussion with Hq USAFE/XP, USAFE/DO, and USAFE/IN staff, Ramstein AB, Germany, May 2, 2001.

[403]Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond , New York, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 2000, p. 24.

[404]As one observer wrote of Operation Allied Force afterward, “so low was NATO’s credibility with Milosevic that the threat of war and even war itself were not enough to convince him that he had anything to fear.” Christopher Cviic, “A Victory All the Same,” Survival , Summer 2000, p. 178.

[405]Adam Roberts, “NATO’s ‘Humanitarian War’ over Kosovo,” Survival , Autumn 1999, pp. 110–111.

[406]This point bears emphasizing. It was not just that Serbia’s stakes in Kosovo were much higher than in Bosnia. The two cases diverged additionally in three fundamental ways, each of which should logically have led the United States and NATO to adopt a more robust and considered strategy in the Kosovo war. First, the 1995 NATO air campaign was linked to a major ground effort by Croatian and Bosnian forces coming in from the north and west and by some 10,000 NATO troops who had been deployed weeks prior to the onset of the bombing. In 1999, in contrast, the ground element was expressly ruled out at the highest levels. Second, the objective of Deliberate Force was limited (ending the siege of Sarajevo) and achievable through a phased, coercive bombing campaign, whereas the goals of Allied Force were ambiguous (including forcing Milosevic back to the bargaining table) and more difficult to achieve through air power alone. Finally, even before the onset of the 1995 bombing, Milosevic had told U.S. negotiators that he was interested in forging a deal to end the war in Bosnia on terms acceptable to the international community. That was anything but the case on the eve of Allied Force. I thank Ivo Daalder of the Brookings Institution for calling my attention to these differences.