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[172]Barry R. Posen, “The War for Kosovo: Serbia’s Political‑Military Strategy,” International Security , Spring 2000, p. 75. One can, however, question Posen’s subsequent suggestion that Milosevic achieved “some political success” by holding out as long as he did, considering that he lost control of Kosovo, suffered heavy damage to his infrastructure and economy, and ultimately was defeated in a fair election, arrested, and jailed for having committed crimes against the state.

[173]“NATO’s Game of Chicken,” Newsweek , July 26, 1999, p. 59.

[174]For detailed amplification on this point, see Hosmer, The Conflict over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did .

[175]Quoted in John T. Correll, “Lessons Drawn and Quartered,” Air Force Magazine , December 1999, p. 2.

[176]Quoted in Robert Hewson, “Allied Force, Part II: Overwhelming Air Power,” World Air Power Journal , Winter 1999/2000, p. 97. Three days later, Draskovic was fired by Prime Minister Momir Bulatovic for having made that statement.

[177]Blaine Harden, “The Milosevic Generation,” New York Times Magazine , August 29, 1999, p. 34.

[178]“Sacked Yugoslav Air Chief Killed,” London Times , June 2, 1999. See also William Drozdiak and Steven Mufson, “NATO Sending Tough Terms to Belgrade,” Washington Post , June 2, 1999.

[179]Quoted in Chris Hedges, “Angry Serbs Hear a New Explanation: It’s All Russia’s Fault,” New York Times , July 16, 1999.

[180]Indeed, from a low of fewer than 100 daily strike sorties flown during the air war’s fifth night, the bombing effort intensified steadily and uninterruptedly to almost three times that number by the eve of Milosevic’s capitulation on June 3. Briefing by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 10, 1999, cited in Major General Eitan Ben‑Eliahu, commander, Israeli Air Force, “Air Power in the 21st Century: The Impact of Precision Weapons,” Military Technology , April 2000, p. 40.

[181]It bears acknowledging here, however, that only the authoritative report of NATO’s intent to proceed with an eventual ground invasion, should the bombing alone fail to dislodge Milosevic, finally convinced Moscow to play its constructive role in June 1999. Russia’s deploying of Chernomyrdin helped negotiate an international military presence in Kosovo, thus warding off a NATO‑only presence and preserving at least some Russian influence in the Balkans. On this point, see the informed comment offered by former Russian foreign ministry Balkan official Oleg Levitin, “Inside Moscow’s Kosovo Muddle,” Survival , Spring 2000, p. 138.

[182]William Arkin, “Yugoslavia Trip Report,” September 8, 1999. In a similar vein, Karl Mueller suggested that “while it was not clear how NATO was going to win, it certainly would continue the effort until it managed to do so. From this perspective, it was not what NATO was bombing that mattered, but the fact that it was continuing to bomb….” Karl Mueller, “Deus ex Machina? Coercive Air Power in Bosnia and Kosovo,” unpublished paper, School of Advanced Air Power Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, November 7, 1999, p. 10.

[183]David Atkinson, “B‑2s Demonstrated Combat Efficiency over Kosovo,” Defense Daily , July 1, 1999, p. 1.

[184]Comments on an earlier draft by Hq USAFE/SA, April 6, 2001.

[185]Kosovo: Lessons from the Crisis , Report to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defense, The Stationery Office, London, England, June 2000, p. 36.

[186]“AWOS Fact Sheet,” Hq USAFE/SA, December 17, 1999.

[187]The qualification “U.S.‑led” is appropriate here, considering that the Israeli Air Force has made regular and highly effective use of UAVs over southern Lebanon for nearly two decades, going back to the Beka’a valley air campaign of 1982.

[188]The wing had most of the essential support assets on hand, so deploying squadrons did not need to bring much by way of logistics overhead.

[189]Dale Eisman, “Over Balkans, It’s Beauty vs. the Beast,” Norfolk Virginian‑Pilot , April 26, 1999.

[190]Vince Crawley, “B‑2s See Combat over Yugoslavia,” Defense Week , March 29, 1999, p. 6.

[191]Of the nine available B‑2s at Whiteman, one was kept aside for training, one was undergoing final upgrades to Block 30 status, and one was in extensive maintenance. “Missouri‑to‑Kosovo Flights for B‑2 Not a Concern to Wing Commander,” Inside the Air Force , July 2, 1999, p. 12.

[192]“B‑2 Performed Better in Kosovo Than USAF Expected,” Inside the Pentagon , July 8, 1999, p. 11.

[193]“Jumper on Air Power,” Air Force Magazine , July 2000, p. 43.

[194]Paul Richter, “B‑2 Drops Its Bad PR in Air War,” Los Angeles Times , July 8, 1999.

[195]Adam Hebert, “Air Force Follows Roadmap in Employment of Bombers Against Serbia,” Inside the Air Force , April 2, 1999, p. 2.

[196]Barry D. Watts, “The EA‑6B, E‑8C, and B‑2 in Operation Allied Force,” Northrop Grumman Analysis Center briefing, Rosslyn, Virginia, May 8, 2000.

[197]Barry D. Watts, The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment , Washington, D.C., Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, February 2001, p. 42.

[198]Watts, “The EA‑6B, E8C, and B‑2 in Operation Allied Force.”

[199]Colonel Tony Imondi, 509th Operations Group commander, quoted in Bill Sweet‑man, “B‑2 Is Maturing into a Fine Spirit,” Jane’s International Defense Review , May 2000.

[200]Brigadier General Randy Gelwix, USAF, “Oral Histories Accomplished in Conjunction with Operation Allied Force/Noble Anvil.”

[201]Donald B. Rice, “No Stealth to Pentagon’s Bias Against the B‑2,” Los Angeles Times , May 9, 1999.

[202]David A. Fulghum, “Lessons Learned May Be Flawed,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , June 14, 1999, p. 205. A serious limiting factor affecting the first of these suggested solutions is that doubling the B‑2’s crew ratio would require either doubling the number of training sorties and hours flown by the Air Force’s limited B‑2 inventory or reducing the number of sorties and flying hours made available for each B‑2 crew member–to a point where their operational proficiency and expertise would be unacceptably compromised. Alternatively, the Air Force is now taking a close look at using RAF Fairford, England, and the island bases of Diego Garcia and Guam as forward staging areas from which to conduct B‑2 operations in future regional contingencies worldwide.

[203]William M. Arkin, “In Praise of Heavy Bombers,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , July–August 1999. Another 218 U.S. and British TLAMs were fired during Operation Allied Force.

[204]“Despite Losses, Backers Say Unmanned Systems Excelling Over Kosovo,” Inside the Pentagon , June 10, 1999, p. 1.

[205]John D. Morrocco, David Fulghum, and Robert Wall, “Weather, Weapons Dearth Slow NATO Strikes,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , April 5, 1999, p. 29.

[206]“Air Force Reluctant to Deploy All‑Weather Predator UAVs to Balkans,” Inside the Air Force , April 2, 1999, p. 1. Another concern had to do with a larger requirements debate within the Air Force over whether UAVs developed under a fast‑track acquisition process, as was Predator, should be managed like a more expensive fighter program.

[207]Jane Perlez, “Serbs Try to Empty Disputed Province, NATO Aides Assert,” New York Times , March 29, 1999.

[208]“Jumper on Air Power,” p. 42.

[209]One problem pointed up by this mode of operation was the slow flying speed of the aircraft. At a maximum airspeed of only 70 nautical miles per hour, Predator typically required considerable time to get to a previously located target candidate, by which time the latter may have moved to a new location.

[210]Elizabeth Becker, “They’re Unmanned, They Fly Low, and They Get the Picture,” New York Times , June 3, 1999.

[211]Tim Ripley, “Task Force Hunter,” World Air Power Journal , Winter 1999/2000, p. 122.

[212]David A. Fulghum, “Joint STARS May Profit from Yugoslav Ops,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , July 26, 1999, p. 74.

[213]William M. Arkin, “Top Air Force Leaders to Get Briefed on Serbia Air War Report,” Defense Daily , June 13, 2000, p. 1. For further details on UAV operations, see Lieutenant Commander J. D. Dixon, “UAV Employment in Kosovo: Lessons for the Operational Commander,” paper submitted to the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, February 8, 2000.

[214]David A. Fulghum, “Kosovo Conflict Spurred New Airborne Technology Use,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , August 23, 1999, p. 30.

[215]Craig Covault, “Military Space Dominates Air Strikes,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , March 29, 1999, pp. 31–32.

[216]Peter Grier, “The Investment in Space,” Air Force Magazine , February 2000, p. 50.

[217]On the other hand, cockpit multifunction display videotapes showing successfully impacting munitions were not used in the BDA process by the Joint Analysis Center at RAF Molesworth, resulting in numerous revisits to targets that were already known by attacking pilots to have been struck before to good effect. Conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Ray Dissinger, Aviano AB, Italy, June 12, 2000.

[218]The Hook 112 was developed by the Air Force for use between downed aircrew members and CSAR forces to eliminate a problem presented by the previous survival radio, which allowed enemy monitors to locate the downed crewmember’s position by triangulating on the relatively lengthy voice exchanges required to coordinate a rescue by CSAR teams. The Hook 112 communicates the downed crewmember’s position by means of an encrypted burst transmission that denies enemy monitors the ability to triangulate. A GPS receiver incorporated in the Hook 112 automatically transmits the crewmember’s exact location, along with any coded transmissions the downed crewmember may wish to communicate. Major General Gary Dylewski, “The USAF Space Warfare Center: Bringing Space to the Warfighter,” in Peter L. Hays et al., eds, Spacepower for a New Millennium: Space and U.S. National Security , New York, McGraw‑Hill, 2000, p. 96.

[219]“Space Support to Operation Allied Force: Preliminary Lessons Learned,” briefing to the author by Colonel Robert Bivins, director of operations, U.S. Air Force Space Warfare Center, Schriever AFB, Colorado, February 25, 2000.

[220]Major General Robert Hinson, commander, 14th Air Force, “Space Doctrine Lessons from Operation Allied Force,” command briefing, Vandenberg AFB, California, December 16, 1999.

[221]The “flex” targeting effort entailed the launching of combat aircraft without specific assigned target locations and coordinates, although tasked to seek out various classes of targets, either through free search or upon being directed to a specific area of known or suspected enemy activity by the CAOC or an airborne forward air controller.

[222]Dana Priest, “NATO Unlikely to Alter Strategy,” Washington Post , March 26, 1999.

[223]Dana Priest, “NATO Pilots Set to Confront Potent Foe,” Washington Post , March 24, 1999.

[224]General John Jumper, USAF, “Oral Histories Accomplished in Conjunction with Operation Allied Force/Noble Anvil.”

[225]Robert Wall, “Sustained Carrier Raids Demonstrate New Strike Tactics,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , May 10, 1999, p. 37.

[226]Robert Wall, “Airspace Control Challenges Allies,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , April 26, 1999, p. 30.

[227]Tim Ripley, “Viper Weasels,” World Air Power Journal , Winter 1999/2000, p. 102. The standard F‑16CJ weapons loadout was two AGM‑88 HARMs and four AIM‑120 advanced medium‑range air‑to‑air missiles (AMRAAMs).

[228]Richard J. Newman, “In the Skies over Serbia,” U.S. News and World Report , May 24, 1999, p. 24. It bears noting here that 10 or more pilots operating in a target area might report an observed SAM shot as ballistic, while the one pilot on whose helmet the missile was figuratively guiding would be actively reacting to it. Shortly thereafter, 10 pilots would recover to widely dispersed home bases and report nonthreatening ballistic launches, while only one would return with the evidence of a guided shot. This drove a perception among Allied Force leaders that “most” of the SAM shots observed were ballistic. Once all the pertinent information was fused and duplicate reporting was factored out, however, it turned out that a substantial number of SAM launches (perhaps as many as a third) were guided. Comments on an earlier draft by Hq USAFE/IN, May 18, 2001.

[229]Cited in “Ground Troops Lauded,” European Stars and Stripes , August 6, 1999, and “Jumper on Air Power,” Air Force Magazine , July 2000, p. 41.

[230]Further mitigating this constraint, the limited surveillance range of Joint STARS caused by interposed ridge lines restricted E‑8 operations primarily with regard to Kosovo, which harbored only a limited SAM threat (only one of the 5 SA‑6 regiments and no SA‑2s or SA‑3s). Most of the enemy IADS targets were assessed to lie outside Kosovo. Moreover, the U‑2 and Rivet Joint typically performed well and did not suffer the same problems that sometimes plagued the E‑8. Comments on an earlier draft by Hq USAFE/IN, May 18, 2001.

[231]Wall, “Airspace Control Challenges Allies.”

[232]Brigadier General Randy Gelwix, USAF, “Oral Histories Accomplished in Conjunction with Operation Allied Force/Noble Anvil.”

[233]Wall, “Airspace Control Challenges Allies,” p. 30.

[234]The AGM‑130 could be fired from a standoff range of up to 30 nautical miles. It featured GPS guidance, enhanced by terminal homing via man in the loop through live video feed data‑linked to the attacking aircraft from the guiding weapon.

[235]The Block 50/52 F‑16CJs used for defense suppression were equipped to carry the AGM‑65 Maverick missile, but they did not employ that munition in Allied Force because the pilots, given their predominant focus on making the most of the AGM‑88 HARM, had not sufficiently trained for its use.

[236]Gelwix, “Oral Histories.” JSOW was employed only infrequently during Allied Force. Many of the targets assigned to the Navy were inappropriate for attack by the AGM‑154’s cluster‑bomb variant because of collateral damage concerns and the lengthy timelines associated with attacks against mobile targets and with the munition’s lack of a precise impact timeline. William M. Arkin, “Fleet Praises JSOW, Lists Potential Improvements,” Defense Daily , April 26, 2000.

[237]Lieutenant Colonel Philip C. Tissue, USMC, “21 Minutes to Belgrade,” Proceedings , U.S. Naval Institute, September 1999, p. 40.

[238]Michael R. Gordon, “NATO to Hit Serbs from 2 More Sides,” New York Times , May 11, 1999.

[239]“AWOS Fact Sheet,” Hq USAFE/SA, December 17, 1999. See also William M. Arkin, “Top Air Force Leaders to Get Briefed on Serbia Air War Report,” Defense Daily , June 13, 2000, p. 1.

[240]David A. Fulghum, “Kosovo Report to Boost New JSF Jamming Role,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , August 30, 1999, p. 22.

[241]“Washington Outlook,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , September 20, 1999, p. 25.

[242]“AWOS Fact Sheet,” Hq USAFE/SA, December 17, 1999.

[243]In all, 1,479 ALE‑50 towed decoys were expended by U.S. aircraft during Allied Force.

[244]Comments on an earlier draft by Hq USAFE/IN, May 18, 2001.

[245]Tim Ripley, “‘Serbs Running Out of SAMs,’ Says USA,” Jane’s Defense Weekly , June 2, 1999.

[246]Interview with Lieutenant General Michael Short, USAF, PBS Frontline , “War in Europe,” February 22, 2000. Serb IADS operators may have been able to trade short‑term effectiveness for longer‑term survivability because allied aircraft were typically unable to find and successfully attack VJ fielded forces and other mobile ground targets. Had they been able to do so and to kill VJ troops in large numbers, the VJ’s leadership would have insisted on a more aggressive air defense effort. That would have enabled NATO to kill more SAMs, but at the probable cost of more friendly aircraft lost. I am indebted to my RAND colleague John Stillion for this insight.

[247]David A. Fulghum, “Serb Threat Subsides, but U.S. Still Worries,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , April 12, 1999, p. 24.

[248]“Jumper on Air Power,” p. 43.

[249]David A. Fulghum, “Yugoslavia Successfully Attacked by Computers,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , August 23, 1999, pp. 31–34.

[250]Zoran Kusovac, “Russian S‑300 SAMs ‘In Serbia,’” Jane’s Defense Weekly , August 4, 1999.

[251]Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond , New York, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 2000, p. 109.

[252]For example, the SA‑10 and SA‑12, now available on the international arms market for foreign military sale, are lethal out to a slant range of some 80 nautical miles, five times the killing reach of the earlier‑generation SA‑3 (David A. Fulghum, “Report Tallies Damage, Lists U.S. Weaknesses,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , February 14, 2000, p. 34). One SA‑10/12 site in Belgrade and one in Pristina could have provided defensive coverage of all of Serbia and Kosovo, as well as threatened Compass Call and the ABCCC operating outside enemy airspace.

[253]David A. Fulghum, “NATO Unprepared for Electronic Combat,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , May 10, 1999, p. 35. A thorough and detailed account of the many problems and concerns identified and highlighted with respect to the USAF’s current SEAD and electronic warfare repertoire is contained in the summary report of an Air Force–commissioned study by RAND’s Natalie Crawford and seven senior retired Air Force general‑officer electronic warfare experts, “USAF EW Management Process Study,” briefing charts, October 1, 1999.

[254]Fulghum, “NATO Unprepared for Electronic Combat,” p. 35.

[255]“Washington Outlook,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , August 23, 1999, p. 27.

[256]Robert Wall, “SEAD Concerns Raised in Kosovo,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , June 26, 1999, p. 75.

[257]“Washington Outlook,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , June 7, 1999, p. 23.

[258]“Washington Outlook,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , May 24, 1999, p. 27.

[259]Although some criticism was voiced afterward as to how CSAR had been shown to be “broken” because of problems that cropped up during the rescue operation (apparently, one of the helicopters was forced to disengage, refuel, and penetrate enemy airspace a second time before it could find and finally retrieve the downed pilot), genuine acts of heroism were displayed during the mission. It ended up a brilliant success and had the welcome effect of turning a propaganda coup for Milosevic almost instantly into a propaganda coup for NATO. On the criticism expressed, see Rowan Scarborough, “Air Force Search and Rescue Operations Called ‘Broken,’” Washington Times , September 13, 1999.

[260]James Peltz and Jeff Leeds, “Stealth Fighter’s Crash Reveals a Design’s Limits,” Los Angeles Times , March 30, 1999.

[261]“Washington Outlook,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , May 3, 1999, p. 21. Asked whether the aircraft’s loss was caused by a failure to observe proper lessons from earlier experience, Hawley added: “That’s an operational issue that is very warm.”

[262]Eric Schmitt, “Shrewd Serb Tactics Downed Stealth Jet, U.S. Inquiry Shows,” New York Times , April 11, 1999. In subsequent testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary of the Air Force F. Whitten Peters did confirm that the aircraft had been downed by enemy SAMs. See Vince Crawley, “Air Force Secretary Advocates C‑130, Predators,” Defense Week , July 26, 1999, p. 2.

[263]See David A. Fulghum and William B. Scott, “Pentagon Gets Lock on F‑117 Shoot‑down,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , April 19, 1999, pp. 28–30, and Paul Beaver, “Mystery Still Shrouds Downing of F‑117A Fighter,” Jane’s Defense Weekly , September 1, 1999.

[264]To bolster their case, some noted that when an F‑117 had crashed earlier at an air show near Baltimore in 1998, the Air Force had thoroughly sanitized the area and hauled off the wreckage to prevent its most sensitive features from being compromised.

[265]Vago Muradian, “Stealth Compromised by Not Destroying F‑117 Wreckage,” Defense Daily , April 2, 1999.

[266]Ibid.

[267]On April 2, the Yugoslav government announced its intention to hand over pieces of the downed F‑117 to Russian authorities. Robert Hewson, “Operation Allied Force: The First 30 Days,” World Air Power Journal , Fall 1999, p. 18. For the record, it should be noted that USAF F‑15Es were immediately put on alert to destroy the wreckage with AGM‑130s after the F‑117 downing was confirmed, but by the time the wreckage location could be positively determined, CNN was on the scene and collateral damage issues precluded the attack. Comments on an earlier draft by Hq USAF/XOXS, July 9, 2001.

[268]General John Jumper, USAF, “Oral Histories Accomplished in Conjunction with Operation Allied Force/Noble Anvil.”

[269]Robert Wall, “Joint STARS Changes Operational Scheme,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , May 3, 1999, pp. 25–27.

[270]I am indebted to my colleague John Stillion for developing these points.

[271]Personal communication to the author from Price Bingham, Northrop Grumman Corporation, Melbourne, Florida, December 20, 1999.

[272]Lieutenant Colonel L. T. Wight, USAF, “What a Tangled Web We Wove: An After‑Action Assessment of Operation Allied Force’s Command and Control Structure and Processes,” unpublished paper, no date, p. 12. Colonel Wight was a member of the C‑5 Strategy Cell at the CAOC.

[273]Ibid.

[274]Tim Ripley, “Harriers over the Kosovo ‘Kill Boxes,’” World Air Power Journal , Winter 1999/2000, p. 100.

[275]Brigadier General Randy Gelwix, USAF, “Oral Histories Accomplished in Conjunction with Operation Allied Force/Noble Anvil.”

[276]Ripley, “Harriers over the Kosovo ‘Kill Boxes.’”

[277]Robert Wall, “Maverick Fix Tested in Kosovo,” Aviation Week and Space Technology , September 6, 1999, pp. 88–89.

[278]Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Henry H. Shelton, Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After‑Action Report , Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, Report to Congress, January 31, 2000, p. 58.

[279]The airfield itself offered an 8,200‑ft runway and a tactical air navigation (TACAN) system enabling the aircraft to fly instrument approaches, but it lacked a ready communications link to the CAOC in Vicenza and also needed more fuel trucks, as well as runway arresting gear in the event of wet runways and aircraft emergencies. The latter were shipped in and quickly became a welcome presence because high‑gross‑weight landings in heavy rain proved to be routine.

[280]As one downside aspect worth noting in this respect, numerous aircrews later indicated that night‑vision goggles often provided them with too much information because they were capable of picking up infrared events as far as 100 miles away.

[281]For further details, see Margaret Bone, “Kodak Moments in Kosovo,” The Hook , Spring 2000, pp. 29–31.

[282]Tissue, “21 Minutes to Belgrade,” pp. 38–40.

[283]Conversation with Major General P. J. M. Godderij, deputy commander in chief, Royal Netherlands Air Force, Scheveningen, the Netherlands, June 7, 2000.

[284]William Drozdiak, “Air War Commander Says Kosovo Victory Near,” Washington Post , May 24, 1999.

[285]William M. Arkin, “Limited Warfare in Kosovo Not Working,” Seattle Times , May 22, 1999.

[286]Paul Richter, “Milosevic War Machine Has a Lot of Fight Left,” Los Angeles Times , April 29, 1999.

[287]Robert Hewson, “Allied Force, Part II: Overwhelming Air Power,” World Air Power Journal , Winter 1999/2000, p. 113.

[288]Michael Evans, “Serb Army Talks of Peace as Armor Takes a Pounding,” London Times , June 2, 1999.

[289]Rowan Scarborough, “Pentagon Intends to Issue Final Count of Serbian Losses,” Washington Times , July 9, 1999.

[290]Over the course of the 11‑day Serb withdrawal, NATO observers counted 220 tanks, 300 APCs, and 308 artillery pieces being loaded onto trucks and transporters, along with hundreds of other vehicles and assorted military equipment. Steven Lee Myers, “Damage to Serb Military Less Than Expected,” New York Times , June 28, 1999.

[291]“Yugoslav Army Lost 524 Soldiers, Top General Says,” International Herald Tribune , July 22, 1999.

[292]Briefing by Admiral James O. Ellis, USN, commander in chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, and commander, Allied Forces Southern Europe and Joint Task Force Noble Anvil, no date given.

[293]Joseph Fitchett, “NATO Misjudged Bombing Damage,” International Herald Tribune , June 23, 1999. General Jumper dismissed criticisms from some that expensive U.S. precision munitions had been wasted on decoys. Declaring that U.S. forces had had “plenty of bombs for decoys,” he noted that what appeared to be legitimate targets were immediately attacked so that aircrews would not loiter over target areas trying to distinguish real targets from decoys and exposing themselves needlessly to enemy fire. Aviation Week and Space Technology , September 20, 1999, p. 25.

[294]Paul Richter, “U.S. Study of War on Yugoslavia Aimed at Boosting Performance,” Los Angeles Times , July 10, 1999.

[295]Cohen and Shelton, After‑Action Report , pp. 84–85.

[296]As the team’s concept of operations clearly stipulated, the mission objective was to “determine Allied Force munition effectiveness by selective examination of fixed and mobile target sets within Kosovo [and to] evaluate and record physical and functional target damage and precise weapons impact locations and characteristics, with emphasis on precision and near‑precision air‑dropped munitions.” The concept of operations further stipulated that validation of NATO’s air campaign, target set, BDA, and rationale for specific target selection were “beyond the scope of this survey.” Documentation provided to the author by Hq USAFE/SA, May 2, 2001.