OPERATIONAL HISTORY

Since the May 1, 1960 U‑2 shoot‑down, successive US Presidents continued Eisenhower’s pledge not to sanction manned overflights of the Soviet Union. The loss of Maj Rudy Anderson’s U‑2 to an SA‑2 over Cuba both highlighted the aircraft’s vulnerability and vindicated the decision to build a replacement, but still the question remained: where could Oxcart, this highly sophisticated, multi‑million‑dollar program, be deployed?

One possible mission arose in 1964, when KH‑4 Corona satellite imagery obtained what some analysts believed was an antiballistic missile site, located at Tallinn in Estonia. The Office of Special Activities (OSA) proposed that a composite mission should be flown consisting of a camera‑equipped Oxcart, and a U‑2 configured for gathering ELINT. The highly classified proposal had the classified cryptonym Project Upwind. The plan was to fly the A‑12, with air refueling support, from the United States to the Baltic Sea, where it would rendezvous with the U‑2. The Oxcart would then fly down the Baltic Sea, skirting the coasts of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and East Germany before heading back west to the United States. The 11,000‑mile flight would take eight hours, 40 minutes to complete and require four air refuelings. Remaining outside Soviet airspace, it was hoped that the high‑speed, high‑altitude target would provoke Soviet radar operators into activating the Tallinn system. The A‑12 would secure high‑resolution imagery of the Tallinn site whilst the more vulnerable U‑2 would be standing off, beyond SA‑2 range, recording the radar’s signal characteristics. Both Agency and Defense Department officials supported the proposal; however, Secretary of State Dean Rusk was strongly opposed and the influential 303 Committee never forwarded the proposal to President Johnson for his approval.

Another possible area of operations for Oxcart was Cuba. By early 1964, Project Headquarters had already begun planning for possible “contingency overflights” under a program codenamed Skylark. Four of the 13 A‑12s then at Area 51 were initially designated as primary Skylark aircraft, namely Articles 125, 127, 128, and 132, and they were later joined by Articles 129 and 131 following the installation of further modifications.

A meeting on September 15, 1964 between Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, and DCI John McCone, discussed the limitations of satellite coverage of Cuba in the context of monitoring assurances made by the Soviet Union following the 1962 missile crisis not to redeploy nuclear missiles on the island. The discussion also covered the vulnerability of the U‑2 to undertake such missions in the light of past events and the very real SAM threat. It was agreed that Oxcart overflights would be less vulnerable than the U‑2, but not entirely invulnerable. McNamara believed that one flight every 30 days would provide enough coverage of the island to fulfill the United States Intelligence Board requirements; but others in attendance disagreed, particularly on the number of sorties required, given a study of the history of weather over Cuba. The parties adjourned, agreeing that the subject should receive further study that should include Oxcart vulnerability under the Skylark program and a substantive judgment as to the number of flights required from November 1964 to November 1965 in order to accomplish acceptable coverage of the island with usable photography.

^{When deployed to Kadena AB on the island of Okinawa during Black Shield, the three Oxcarts wore an all‑black paint scheme with no national insignia and a dark red, bogus serial number applied to the tail. Article 125 (60‑6928) was not one of the three aircraft deployed on operations as it had crashed, with the loss of its pilot, Walt Ray, on January 5, 1967. (Lockheed Martin)}

^{Mele Vojvodich, pictured in his David Clark S‑901 full pressure suit, was the first to deploy an Oxcart to Kadena AB and also the first to fly an operational mission – BX001 on May 31, 1967. (CIA)}

To bring the A‑12s up to the necessary standard required to participate in the envisaged missions, a two‑point plan was developed, and both Phase I and Phase II were to begin simultaneously on March 1, 1965. Phase I focused on increasing the aircraft’s speed envelope out from Mach 2.9 to Mach 3.05; Phase II concentrated on providing Oxcart with the capability to undertake three air refuelings during the course of a mission and an element, codenamed Supermarket, related to improvements in the A‑12’s ECM system. As an interim, on August 5, 1965, the Director of the National Security Agency, Gen Marshall S. Carter, directed that Skylark was to achieve emergency operational readiness by November 5. Should security considerations dictate, any contingency sorties would have to be executed below the optimum capability of the A‑12 – nearer to Mach 2.8. In order to meet this tight timeframe, the Oxcarts would have to deploy without their full ECM suite; but despite all the difficulties, a limited Skylark capability was ready on the prescribed date. In the event, these Cuban contingencies were never implemented: on September 15, 1966, the 303 Committee voted not to commit Oxcart to Cuban reconnaissance missions, on the basis that it could disturb the prevailing political calm. Instead, a more critical situation developing in Southeast Asia took priority.