The Pueblo affair

On January 5, 1968, US Navy Auxiliary General Environmental Research Ship number 2 (AGER‑2), USS Pueblo , proceeded as ordered unprotected, on its maiden voyage to “sample the electronic environment off the east coast of North Korea.” On board were a crew of six officers, two civilians, and 75 enlisted men. Just 18 days later during the night of January 23, the ship’s radio operator managed to get off an emergency signal. “We Need Help! We Are Holding Emergency Destruction! We Need Support! SOS. SOS. SOS. Please Send Assistance! SOS. SOS. SOS. We Are Being Boarded!’ The last sentence clearly stated what was happening aboard the beleaguered vessel, and with one sailor dead and the rest of the crew captured, the year‑long nightmare for Lt Cdr Lloyd M. Bucher and his crew was just beginning.

In response to this potentially explosive international incident, President Johnson summoned his top advisors to a meeting at the White House the very next day (January 24) to plan a response and agree a course of action. Later that same day, DCI Richard Helms dispatched a top‑secret memo to Walt Rostow, Special Assistant to the President; Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara; Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach; Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, and Chairman of the JCS, Gen Earle Wheeler, in which he referred to the earlier meeting and confirmed that he was “alerting an Oxcart mission for photo reconnaissance of North Korea.” It continued: “The Oxcart mission has been alerted to take off [deleted] on 25th January at 2100 EST (1100 / 26 January [delete]) and return four and a half hours later. The film will be off loaded immediately and airlifted to Eastman Kodak, Rochester, New York, to arrive at approximately 0430 EST on 27 January. The processed film will be delivered immediately to NPIC with an arrival time of 1440 EST on 28 January.” Point 3 in the memo noted, “The weather forecast for this mission indicates Category II (25 percent or less cloud cover) weather conditions for the target area.” Finally point 4 noted, “No additional resources or support over and above those normally used on Oxcart North Vietnam operational sorties will be required for this mission.”

The draft CIA plan to overfly North Korea was about to be implemented in full; in all, three A‑12 sorties would be flown as a consequence of the capture of USS Pueblo . The first of the three sorties was BX6847, flown on January 26, 1968, by Jack Weeks in Article 131 – just 24 hours after the ship was captured. The Oxcart was equipped with Pin Peg, Mad Moth, Blue Dog II ECM defense suite, System IV ELINT recorder, and a Type I camera. USS Pueblo was located at anchor some distance from Wonsan Bay, and despite a right engine inlet unstart on the third pass, Jack’s four‑hour sortie was a spectacular success – helped by the fact that 90 percent of North Korea was cloud‑free. A declassified critique of the mission noted that 71 of 84 programed targets were imaged, together with one surface‑to‑surface missile target, 81 of the 126 Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX) targets, plus 13 SAM sites – of which 12 were occupied – and 752 bonus targets. The report concluded that BX6847 “obtained good baseline coverage of most of North Korea’s armed forces, as well as large portions of the transportation system and industrial base” – testament indeed to the platform’s outstanding capabilities.

^{Jack Weeks was the first Oxcart pilot to be sent over North Korea to try to locate the hapless USS Pueblo , a mission his Type I camera system accomplished during BX6847 on January 26, 1968. (National Archives via Talent‑Keyhole.com)}

Despite the undisputed success of BX6847, US State Department officials were extremely wary of endorsing a second mission over North Korea after the Pueblo incident. The diplomatic scars left by the 1960 U‑2/Powers shoot‑down were still sensitive eight years later. It wasn’t until Brig Gen Paul Baclais (Director of the OSA) had briefed Secretary of State Dean Rusk on the specific mission objectives and assured him that the aircraft would only be in North Korean airspace for seven minutes (two passes or “photo lines”) that the State Department gave its blessing and the three‑hour 39‑minute sortie, designated BX6853, was flown in Article 127 by Frank Murray on February 19, 1968. Equipped with the same sensors as the previous incursion, 88 percent of the programed targets were cloud‑free; however, this proved not to be the case where USS Pueblo was concerned, and she remained hidden from 127’s prying Type I camera.

On May 6, 1968, Jack Layton launched Article 127 on sortie BX6858 and headed out on Oxcart’s third mission to North Korea. Unknown to him at the time, his mission proved to be the final operational flight of the entire A‑12 program. The reconnaissance “take” was disappointing in comparison to the two earlier missions as 50 percent of the programed targets suffered degradation due to cloud and haze. Then on the high‑speed flight back to Kadena AB, “milky white fingers” began slowly clawing their way across the front of the left windshield panel. Having already experienced this “white‑out” phenomenon to a lesser degree during a stateside training sortie, Jack was aware of the problem, which was caused by frictional heating on the windshield to the point that the glue between glass laminations became viscous and turned completely opaque. Proceeding on instruments all the way to landing, Jack completed a successful ground‑directed radar approach for a safe recovery back at Kadena AB after three hours and 30 minutes in the air.

Although the procurement of such intelligence information was not of direct benefit to Lt Cdr Bucher and his crew, who were beaten and not released by their North Korean captors until nearly a year had passed, such a “hot‑spot, quick‑look” capability was considered an early and important achievement of the Oxcart program, clearly demonstrating the validity of manned reconnaissance vehicles and their ability to respond with minimal lead times to international incidents of political and military importance. At the same time, the Pueblo incident signaled the end of the Navy’s seaborne foray into the world of SIGINT trawling, the two remaining AGERs being scrapped soon after USS Pueblo ’s seizure.

^{PARTING SHOT}

^{During the first mission following the resumption of Black Shield sorties on their earlier east – west, west – east tracks over Hanoi, Jack Layton was fired upon by a single SA‑2 whilst flying Article 127 (serial 60‑2930), on 4 January 1968. The missile was fired while its Fan Song guidance radar was operating in low PRF (Pulse Recurrence Frequency) mode. The missile missed its intended target and according to CIA records, this was the last occasion that an Oxcart was fired upon during its operational career.}

^{Article 129 (60‑6932) completed five Black Shield missions and was the last Oxcart to be lost in an accident. Cruelly, it occurred on June 5, 1968 – after the program had officially been canceled – and claimed the life of the pilot, Jack Weeks. (CIA)}