North Korea

In a CIA document classified Top Secret, the rationale was outlined for Oxcart reconnaissance missions against North Korea. It stated that the belligerent pronouncements by North Korean civil and military leaders and an increase in the number and expanded scope of North Korean probes along the DMZ, coupled with their efforts to establish the structure for guerrilla operations in the Republic, had established a critical requirement for accurate intelligence. It further noted that satellite photo missions had not provided adequate imagery of North Korea to satisfy the requirement and that ground collection of this intelligence was becoming increasingly difficult. Taken together, this had made an accurate estimate of capabilities and intentions all but impossible. It continued that the operational concept could now be accomplished on a 24‑hour alert basis, using Oxcart operational Black Shield assets in place at Kadena AB, without coverage degradation of targets in North Vietnam. Three passes traversing the target areas, east to west or west to east, could be accomplished utilizing two air refuelings, or two passes of similar orientation could be executed with a single air refueling. In a footnote at the bottom of an attached sample route map, it added that photographic resolution would be in the order of 1–3½ft and that two eastbound and one westbound pass over the north would take a total of just 17 minutes to complete. Despite this, the US State Department vetoed the plan – but this was about to change.