INTEROPERABILITY PROBLEMS

One of the most surprising aspects of the Allied Force experience was what it revealed about the extent of the discontinuity that had been allowed to develop between U.S air power and that of most other NATO allies who participated.[366]One concern had to do with inadequacies in the equipment operated by the allies. To begin with, there was a pronounced dearth of interoperability with respect to rapid and secure communications. Only at Aviano were there some old STU‑2 secure telephones that allowed the U.S. participants to transfer classified information quickly to allied units. (The STU‑3 secure phone system used by U.S. forces was not available to the allies.) Other classified communications required passing a hard copy of the information by hand, repeating one of the worst command and control deficiencies that had been exposed earlier in Desert Storm, when the ATO had to be flown every day to each of the Navy’s six participating aircraft carriers because the latter were not equipped to receive it electronically.

In addition, many NATO European fighters lacked Have Quick–type frequency‑hopping UHF radios and KY‑58–like radios allowing encrypted communications. As a result, U.S. command and control aircraft were often forced to make transmissions in the clear to those fighters about targets and aircraft positions, enabling the enemy to listen in and gain valuable tactical intelligence.[367]Also, in at least one case, British Harrier GR. Mk 7 pilots were said to have observed suspected refugees in a convoy but were unable to communicate that information to the ABCCC or to USAF F‑16s operating in the same area.[368]For their part, U.S. aircraft equipped with JTIDS frequently were not allowed to rely on that asset, but were instead obliged to use voice communications to ensure adequate situation awareness for all players, notably allied participants not equipped to receive JTIDS signals.[369]

Second, among all participating allied air forces, only U.S., British, Canadian, French, Spanish, and Dutch combat aircraft had the ability to deliver LGBs without offboard target designation assistance. General Short frankly admitted that he could not risk sending the aircraft of many allied countries into harm’s way because of concern for the safety of their pilots and for the civilian casualties that might be caused by inaccurately aimed weapons. Largely for that reason, around 80 percent of all strike sorties flown in Allied Force were carried out by U.S. aircraft.

Additional problems making the job of AWACS operators difficult included the absence of a robust alliance‑wide IFF (identification friend or foe) system, the lack of a capability to detect which SAM systems were targeting allied aircraft, and the small number of non‑U.S. aircraft able to laser‑designate targets, all of which inhibited the usefulness of many allied assets. Some aspects of the discrepancy between U.S. and allied capability were a result of the fact that the European nations typically spend only half the annual U.S. percentage of defense expenditure on military procurement and a third of the annual U.S. percentage on research and development.[370]Others merely reflected allied decisions to invest in different types of equipment. Largely because of that asymmetry, however, the United States provided almost all of the aerial intelligence employed in Allied Force and selected virtually every target attacked in Operation Allied Force. Commenting on these and other interoperability problems, General Naumann expressed concern that the growing technology gap between the United States and its allies could eventually lead to their inability to fight together or even communicate in the same battlespace.[371]

To be sure, not all participating allied air forces suffered equally pronounced problems with respect to capability and versatility. The Royal Netherlands Air Force, for example, not only kept its F‑16s up to date but also provided some aerial refueling capability. The Dutch and the Belgians operated a total of 28 Block 15 F‑16A/B midlife update (MLU) aircraft as a single detachment at Amendola AB, Italy, incorporating modifications that made the aircraft, to all intents and purposes, Block 50‑equivalents. A Dutch F‑16 downed a Serb MiG‑29 with an AIM‑120 AMRAAM during the opening night of the air war, and another used its LANTIRN targeting pod to identify and successfully attack a MiG‑29 on the ground while ignoring several decoys that were parked directly adjacent to it. According to the principal Dutch airman assigned to the CAOC, the Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAF) was “not 100‑percent interoperable but close” and was characterized by senior U.S. airmen as being “most definitely on the A‑Team.”[372]

Moreover, German and Italian Tornados contributed valuable SEAD capabilities, firing some 37 percent of all HARM shots taken during Allied Force. Seven of the nine allies contributing aircraft that dropped bombs in the air war operated PGM‑capable aircraft, which at least made them effective in precision attacks in clear weather against fixed targets. USAF Block 40 F‑16CGs equipped with low‑altitude navigation and targeting infrared for night (LANTIRN) targeting pods and using cooperative strike tactics designated targets for numerous allied aircraft, including the Italian AMX, which were capable of dropping LGBs but lacked any onboard self‑designation capability.

With the USAF now out of the manned tactical reconnaissance business altogether and the Navy’s TARPS‑equipped F‑14s providing the only remaining U.S. operational capability of that nature, three of the five remaining French Mirage IVP supersonic bombers, since converted to the reconnaissance role, added valuable support by being flown daily when the weather permitted, accounting in the end for 20 percent of the Allied Force reconnaissance missions. Operating out of Solenzara, Italy, they flew at 40,000–50,000 ft at a speed of Mach 2.05, typically entering the war zone over Belgrade and exiting over Kosovo, covering some 20 targets on each flight in around 15 minutes. Returning traditional wet‑film photographs to Solenzara, they eventually developed a routine whereby high‑quality images annotated with target information would be digitized for transmission to the CAOC and to French headquarters in Paris.[373]

Finally, two decades of multinational training at Red Flag and elsewhere paid off handsomely in Allied Force. There were no midair collisions or other near‑catastrophic aerial incidents resulting from allies operating from their own private playbooks.