THE AIR WAR UNFOLDS

The operational setting of Yugoslavia contrasted sharply with the one presented to coalition planners by Iraq in 1991. Defined by a series of interwoven valleys partly surrounded by mountains and protected by low cloud cover and fog, Serbia and Kosovo made up an arena smaller than the state of Kentucky (39,000 square miles), with Kosovo itself no larger than the Los Angeles metropolitan area. Its topography and weather–compounded by an enemy IADS that was guaranteed to make offensive operations both difficult and dangerous–promised to provide a unique challenge for NATO air power.

Yugoslavia’s air defenses were dominated by surface‑to‑air missile (SAM) batteries equipped with thousands of Soviet‑made SAMs, including three SA‑2 battalions; 16 SA‑3 battalions, each with numerous launchers directed by LOW BLOW fire‑control radars; and five SA‑6 regiments fielding five batteries each, for a total of 25 SA‑6 batteries directed by STRAIGHT FLUSH radars. These radar‑guided SAMs were supplemented by around 100 vehicle‑mounted SA‑9 and several SA‑13 infrared SAMs, along with a profusion of man‑portable infrared SAMs, some 1,850 antiaircraft artillery (AAA) pieces, and numerous stockpiled reserve weapons and buried communications lines. Backing up these defenses, the Yugoslav air force consisted of 238 combat aircraft, including 15 MiG‑29 and 64 MiG‑21 fighter‑interceptors.[20]Although the Yugoslav IADS employed equipment and technologies that dated as far back as the 1960s, albeit presumably with selected upgrades, its operators knew U.S. tactics well and had practiced air defense drills and honed their operational techniques for more than four decades. They also had the benefit of more equipment and better training than did the Bosnian Serbs in 1995. Finally, they enjoyed the advantage of being protected both by mountainous terrain and by the cover of inclement weather when the air war began.

In addition, Serbia’s SA‑2s, SA‑3s, and SA‑6s were served by more than 100 acquisition and tracking radars, all of which were internetted by underground land lines and fiber optic cables. They were further backstopped by a robust civilian and military visual observer network that included covert Serb observers who monitored NATO aircraft as they took off from their bases in Europe.[21]In anticipation of a possible air offensive, Yugoslav defense specialists had met the month before in Baghdad with their Iraqi counterparts. Indeed, such Yugoslav‑Iraqi collaboration had long preceded the Kosovo crisis. Baghdad had purchased some Yugoslav IADS equipment late during the cold war before the onset of Desert Storm. Iraq also very likely shared intelligence with Belgrade on U.S. suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) tactics, as well as its own experience and recommendations, in subsequent years.[22]According to General Salko Begic, the air commander for the Muslim‑Croat federation in Bosnia and a former service academy classmate of the Serb generals who were running Yugoslavia’s air defenses when the air attacks began, the intended tactic to be used against attacking NATO aircraft was to create a killing zone below 10,000 ft by means of AAA, SA‑7 infrared SAMs, and Swedish Bofors man‑portable air defenses.[23]

In commenting on this layered and redundant air defense net, USAF chief of staff General Michael Ryan, who earlier had commanded Operation Deliberate Force over Bosnia in 1995, frankly conceded in congressional testimony before the start of the operation that “these guys are very good” and that friendly aircraft and aircrew losses were “a distinct possibility.”[24]Ryan added that Yugoslavia’s IADS made for a “very substantive air defense capability” and that the Serbs maintained a “very professional army and air defense corps.” Because of the assessed robustness of the Yugoslav IADS, Pentagon planners were said to have estimated before opening night that NATO could lose as many as 10 aircraft in the initial wave of strikes.[25]