THE COMBAT DEBUT OF THE B‑2

Of major note, Allied Force finally saw the long‑awaited combat debut of the USAF’s B‑2 stealth bomber, which was the first manned aircraft to penetrate Serb air defenses the first night.[189]As the final countdown drew near, expectations ran high throughout the Air Force that the regional combatant commanders in chief around the world, who had long resisted the B‑2’s use in earlier air power applications because of their distrust of unproven systems, would finally be won over by a record of unblemished accomplishment by the aircraft over Serbia and Kosovo. Those expectations were more than vindicated. Of 19 B‑2s all told that had been delivered to the aircraft’s parent 509th Bomb Wing at Whiteman AFB, Missouri, only 9 were available to USEUCOM for combat operations, with the other 10 undergoing avionics upgrades to the aircraft’s definitive Block 30 status.[190]Nevertheless, to the surprise of many, the B‑2 turned out to be the most consistently effective performer of the entire air war. According to the 509th commander at the time, Brigadier General Leroy Barnidge, B‑2 operations demonstrated a 96‑percent weapons effectiveness rate.

Since only six of the nine available aircraft were actually used on combat missions, the average turn time per aircraft was two days.[191]There was never a shortage of capability to meet USEUCOM’s targeting needs, however. Some B‑2s were turned in the time it took to refuel them. The only reported case of a B‑2 component having failed during a combat mission was a malfunction of a rotary bomb launcher, which was promptly repaired upon the aircraft’s return to base.[192]The chief maintenance drivers were said to have been the aircraft’s low‑observable treatment, its flight control system, its synthetic‑aperture radar, and engine accessory drives.

Each B‑2 flew nonstop to its targets in its final Block 30 configuration directly from Whiteman on 28‑ to 32‑hour round‑trip missions, delivering up to 16 global positioning system (GPS)‑guided GBU‑31 joint direct‑attack munitions (JDAMs) from 40,000 ft, usually through cloud cover, against enemy targets including hardened command bunkers and air defense facilities. Those missions typically entailed 15‑hour legs out and back, with two inflight refuelings per leg. Two aircraft were launched on 15 nights and just a single aircraft on 19 nights. The aircrews quickly adjusted to these unprecedentedly long missions and coped with them adequately. They also quickly adapted to the demands of real‑time targeting changes en route. Although the USAF bomber community, by virtue of its traditional nuclear focus, had long been predisposed to do things in a carefully preplanned way, USAFE’s commander, General John Jumper, traveled to Whiteman and personally talked to B‑2 aircrews about the need for rapid adaptability. After just a few hours of intense operator‑to‑operator brainstorming, any residual doubts some B‑2 pilots may have harbored regarding the merits of replacing traditional cold‑war practices with real‑time improvisation as needed to meet current demands were put to rest. The first time the ensuing air effort attempted to apply what came to be called “flex” (for flexible) targeting against enemy assets that had been detected and identified only on short notice, the B‑2s took out two SA‑3 sites that had been assigned to them only a few hours prior to their planned arrival over target.[193]

In all, 49 B‑2 combat sorties were launched out of Whiteman, of which 45 made it to target and were cleared to drop munitions. Although that was less than half a percent of the 9,500 strike sorties flown in Allied Force altogether, the B‑2 dropped 11 percent (some 700) of the bombs delivered against fixed targets in Serbia and Kosovo. It also dropped a full third of all precision munitions expended during the air effort.[194]In addition to its normal load of JDAMs, the B‑2 was also configured to carry the GPS‑guided GBU‑37 for special missions against deeply buried or superhardened targets.[195]A total of 652 JDAMs and 4 GBU‑37s were dropped, with more than 80 percent of the B‑2’s assigned targets being hit on a single pass.[196]In a major improvement in the combat leverage and versatility of the American air weapon, the aircraft proved itself capable of operating effectively above weather that grounded all other allied combat aircraft. It also consistently achieved up to 16 separate target hits per sortie.

It bears emphasizing here that the B‑2 did not merely drop weapons preprogrammed to home in on assigned coordinates, but used its onboard synthetic aperture radar (SAR) to take two successive images of the target during its initial approach. By so doing, the B‑2 was able to eliminate the largest target error source in the JDAM, namely, the error in the exact location of the aim point in GPS space. As a result, the B‑2’s average miss distance with JDAM was less than half the 13 meters stipulated for unassisted JDAMs.[197]

On most nights, penetrating B‑2s received standoff jamming support from Navy or Marine EA‑6Bs, as well as SEAD support from orbiting F‑16CJs standing by as needed as a precautionary measure. On at least one occasion, however, B‑2 strikes occurred without any offboard jamming support. Thanks to the aircraft’s third‑generation stealth properties, it did not require such support to ensure its survivability, and EA‑6B jamming for both the B‑2 and the F‑117 was said to have been “indirect.” Supporting EA‑6B and F‑16CJ pilots were provided with time blocks and rough areas within which the stealthy aircraft would be concurrently operating, but not the exact routing of those aircraft. In the absence of those mission specifics, they relied on time and space deconfliction to maintain safe separation.[198]Because of their low observability and the persistence of overlapping and unlocated enemy SAM defenses, only the B‑2s and F‑117s were committed against targets in downtown Belgrade for the first 58 days of the operation.[199]

Since every B‑2 mission, save one or two, benefited from dedicated offboard electronic countermeasures (ECM) support and was flown against less than top‑of‑the‑line enemy defenses, it remains unclear as to what extent the aircraft’s stealth properties were truly tested in modern combat. However, by all accounts the aircraft was never tracked by enemy radar, let alone shot at by enemy SAMs. Unlike all other aircraft that flew combat missions in Allied Force, the B‑2 operated autonomously. It simply checked in with the ABCCC as it approached the target area, received a go/no‑go code, and pressed ahead to its assigned targets in radio silence. If a target change was required en route, the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) could pass essential information to ingressing B‑2 aircrews as much as an hour and 45 minutes before the aircraft’s scheduled time on target (TOT). That ability to select new targets while airborne enabled the aircraft to take out some enemy SA‑3s and their radars shortly after they were located and identified by allied sensors.[200]The B‑2’s onboard GPS‑aided targeting system (GATS) and SAR also allowed the aircraft to find, identify, and successfully attack imprecisely located targets.

As the air war unfolded, former Secretary of the Air Force Donald Rice observed that the B‑2, although one of the most controversial weapons in the U.S. inventory, was “proving to be the nation’s single most cost‑effective attack aircraft.”[201]Rice further pointed out that the much‑derided stealth treatments on the aircraft had proven themselves durable and reliable and that the aircraft had been consistently flying through inclement weather and returning home in serviceable condition. As for identified shortcomings, the B‑2 was found to need a direct satellite link to national intelligence agencies to provide its crew with a more current picture of the electronic battlefield so that the aircraft could be rerouted in near‑real time to avoid any pop‑up SAM threats that might have been detected after it had taken off. It also became apparent, at least to some observers, that the 509th Bomb Wing’s crew ratio of two two‑pilot crews per aircraft might need to be increased to four crews, or else that provisions might need to be made for future combat contingencies to allow the B‑2 to operate out of airfields closer to the battlespace in the interest of reducing mission times.[202]

Through its consistently effective performance in Allied Force, the B‑2 finally validated the “global reach, global power” concept first articulated by the USAF more than a decade earlier. Along with the B‑52 and B‑1, it showed the value of combat aircraft that are not dependent on bases near the theater of operations. In addition, its consistently successful use of JDAM in near‑precision attacks against high‑priority fixed targets irrespective of weather may, at long last, have presaged an end to the six‑year U.S. habit of routinely resorting to expensive cruise missiles as a seemingly risk‑free way of delivering precision ordnance. Before the start of Allied Force, the Clinton administration had expended nearly 800 cruise missiles, all told, in various punitive attacks against presumed terrorist targets and against Iraq. At a price penalty of as much as $1.5 million a shot in sunk costs, that added up to enough to pay for the purchase of 50,000 JDAMs (for a 62:1 cost ratio).[203]