Air-to-Ground Missiles

From the various permutations of what may be called 'bombs' it is a short step to the air-to-gnd msl. Systems of this class include categories covering dedicated conventional land atk, anti-armor, anti-radiation and anti-ship ops.

In the past most air-to-gnd guided wpns have been designed to atk a single tgt, such as a bridge or concrete emplacement. Attention is now being directed toward the problem of destroying a number of separate tgts in a single firing run, such as a gp of tks. The sys that has gained favor in the US is the Hypervelocity Missile (HVM), with a FLIR sensor tracking both tgts and msls and generating corrective signals that are transmitted over a laser data-link. The msl defeats the armor of the tgt by means of its kinetic energy.

Unguided rockets

In recent years the high cost of guided wpns has encouraged the further development of unguided rkts. The starting point for several new designs was the US Navy 70 mm Folding-Fin Aircraft Rocket (FFAR), the third generation of which can take a flechette whd. Rkts are housed in 4 to 36-tube pod-mounted lchrs which are usually suspended from the underside of the wings.

Some abn lchrs are short racks, others are streamlined pylons.

To summarize, abn wpn systems are gradually providing day/night op, longer ranges and higher kill probabilities against a broad spectrum of tgts.

GULF AIRWAR: LESSONS LEARNED

(US views)

Air theorists have always argued that airpower's unique abilities allow it to strike quickly, powerfully, accurately and at long range. In a war against a modern industrialized country this capability would be dominating.

Doctrinal Lessons

Doctrine, guidance on how to fight most effectively, is vital to success in war. Iraq possessed a large, modern air force, but the lack of doctrine nullified their combat power. The Coalition's air doctrine, on the other hand, enhanced the US forces effectiveness. Nevertheless, several major doctrinal lessons have emerged.

Because airpower has unique characteristics of speed, range and power that together provide an unmatched flexibility, it should be considered indivisible. Over the decades airpower has tended to split into strategic and tactical camps. This division is artificial. It is not the nomenclature of the aircraft that matter, but the objectives sought and targets struck. The air commander must use the assets most appropriate to achieve his objectives, whether they be bombers, fighters or cruise missiles launched from a ship.

The second fundamental principle of air doctrine was the importance of air superiority. It is difficult, if not impossible, for an army to survive once it has lost control of the sky above it. Air superiority is not generally an end in itself but an enabler that allows other land, sea and air missions to operate effectively. Air superiority gained in the first days of Desert Storm, against one of the most heavily defended areas in the world, allowed Coalition forces to maneuver, deploy, resupply, stockpile and fight where and when they wanted and granted the aircraft a safety and freedom that permitted operations at high and medium altitudes with virtual impunity. By the end of the war the Coalition was actually flying combat training missions over enemy territory. We may thus witness a new phenomenon: the battle for air superiority may determine the outcome of a war.

Another important doctrinal lesson was the importance of the unified command of air assets. Airmen have long argued that in order to maximize airpower's flexibility it must be centrally controlled. This concept has been resisted, and there was no overall air commander in either Korea or Vietnam. The problem of fragmented command structure made it difficult for airpower to concentrate efforts and was corrected only in 1986. Then joint doctrine established the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), an airman from any service who would control all the air assets of a joint force and focus them to meet the theater commander's objectives. Desert Storm was the first war to employ a JFACC, and this unity of efforts ensured smooth coordination and an efficient use of Coalition air assets and allowed the conduct of strategic, operational and tactical level air campaigns simultaneously.

Technology Lessons

Technology has always been closely linked to airpower, and in this war high-tech air weapons dominated. For years, critics maintained the emphasis on technology was misguided and that the equipment would not work in combat. This war proved the opposite. Several categories of air weaponry made the victory possible.

Stealth technology works better than most had anticipated. The F-117 was the premier strategic bomber of the war, striking over 30% of the targets during the first two days and all the targets in Baghdad throughout the war; yet it comprised less than 3% of the air assets. The F-117 drew the most difficult targets because of its near invulnerability: not one aircraft was lost or even sustained battle damage. It is likely the Iraqis never knew it was overhead until the bombs impacted. In one sense, the F-117 combat employment has returned airwar to the days before radar.

Another important technological innovation is precision guided munitions (PGMs). PGMs have contributed to the efficiency of airwar by reducing the number of bombs needed to neutralize a target. The laser and television guided bombs of the Coalition seldom missed, even though the Iraqis made extensive use of camouflage, deception and decoys. Precision reduces the large number of sorties needed. The ability of PGMs to penetrate and destroy hardened targets was so impressive that concrete may become obsolete.

Electronic warfare (EW) was another advance used extensively in the Gulf War. Specialized aircraft like the EA-6B 'Prowler' were used to either jam or actively destroy Iraqi air defenses. The jammers confused enemy radars or prevented communications between Iraqi interceptors and their ground controllers. In addition, F/A-18s and other aircraft carried antiradiation missiles that homed on radar emissions. These missiles were so effective that Iraqi defenders were afraid to turn on their radars for fear they would immediately be targeted and destroyed. As a result of EW operations, the Iraqis were largely unable to see or react to air strikes.

For decades, airmen have attempted to strip away the protection of darkness from the enemy, and in this war Coalition airpower owned the night. Systems such as FLIR, LANTIRN, and night vision goggles allowed airmen to acquire and attack targets easily both by day and night.

Intelligence was of crucial importance in Desert Storm. It has long been a truism that the key to airpower is targeting, and the key to targeting is intelligence. This war demonstrated that linkage. If a PGM is now capable of hitting a specific office in a large headquarters complex, then intelligence must know the correct office. The inability to eliminate entirely the Iraqi nuclear research capability was a failure of intelligence, not execution.

The Gulf War seems to indicate we are moving into a new era in warfare. Past centuries have been dominated by ground and sea forces; the 21st century will be dominated by air forces.